topics: |  india | pakistan | military

We Indians are hardly aware of what our army does.  There are a large
number of serious authors writing on military issues, but there is very
little in the way of popular texts for the aam aadmi.  This book,
written by Kenneth Conboy, a specialist on terrorism (see his
counterterrorismblog) and published by Osprey which specializes in
international Army histories, fills the need, but unfortunately it is not
very easy to get hold of in India.

The book is focused on the Commando Forces of India, and makes for a lively
read, based on its sheer content, though the story is told in a rather
disorganized manner.  The descriptions of the various Indian military
operations - not only the 1962, 1965, 1971 wars, but also the operations
against Goa (Nov 1961) and Sikkim (Apr 1975) and the large operation
against Sri Lanka (1987-1990) and the small one at Maldives (1988), as well
as internal operations (Bluestar, 1984) hold considerable interest.

What the book highlights is how far our armed forces are behind many others
in terms of planning, training and equipment (including possibly China) .
A particularly poignant tale is the attempt by the Indian army to have an
amphibious assault force land at Cox's Bazar during the Bangladesh War.
Surely, having a boat that can land on a sand beach is not a very high-tech
affair, the two landing crafts deployed for this purpose, carrying 1500
men, got stranded on sandbars exposing the soldiers in this extremely
vulnerable position for two entire days!  In the end they were unable to
free these vessels, and had to recruit local boats for reaching the shore.
Fortunately, the war was almost over by December 15 and the Pakistan army
had already abandoned Cox's Bazar.  Subsequently, India has had several
practice sessions involving amphibious landings.

While there may be similar books written by Indian authors, it is interesting
that this book was written by an american, and intended for western readers.
It acknowledges the embassies in Washington (both India and Pakistan) as
sources, and suggests some unname-able people.  Of course, there are many
Indian authors who cover this space, but somehow the normal reader may find
that writing comparatively hard to penetrate.  A case in point is Admiral
Hiranandani's detailed Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975
which is too laboured to interest the general reader.

Excerpts

In 1941, the 50 Indian Parachute Brigade was formed with hq in Delhi, and
practiced experimental jump exercises in Karachi in Oct 1941.  A company from
the 152 Indian Para battalion (part of the 50 brigade)
participated in operations in Burma and in Sind.  Another 151 British Para
battalion saw action in the Middle East.  In March 1944, the 50 Indian Para
brigade was part of the operations to repulse the Japanese forces in Imphal
and Kohima.

Subsequently, the 14 Airborne Brigade (earlier the 44 Indian Airborne
Division),  was formed.  Another 77 Indian Para brigade would also be
formed, but in 1950 was reverted to infantry role, when a new Parachute
regiment was permanently formed with HQ at Agra.

Amphibious assault forces

During the Bangladesh war, an amphibious assault was launched on Cox's
Bazar by the "Romeo force" based in Kolkata. The team set sail aboard the
MV Vishva Vijay at 0445 am on the morning of 12 Dec 1971.  On 13 Dec, the
troops (from Bihar battalion, a Gurkha battalion, and artillery),
transferred to two landing ships.  However, the beach gradient needed for
these landing ships was 1 in 30 to 1 in 70, whereas the gradient at the
chosen spot was 1 in 200.  Though the commanders of the Landing ships
pointed this out, the plan proceeded and the ships got stuck in the
sandbars well before the beach.  The gurkha soldiers were ordered to land,
but the water was deep between the sandbar and the beach and weighed down
with their 40 kgs of battle order they started to drown despite wearing
life jackets.  Three gurkha soldiers died trying to get to shore, and one
landing ship was almost lost to the pounding swells.  For two days the
troops sat on the offshore sandbars in an extremely vulnerable position.

Eventually a navy officer (Cmdr Bhalla) swam ashore, went to Cox's
Bazar in local transport, and with the help of the local Mukti Bahini
forces, managed to get some local boats who came and rescued the forces
over the next few days.  Fortunately, Pakistan forces surrendered on Dec
16, and Cox's Bazar had already been deserted by them.  None of the
vehicles and other munitions transported from Calcutta could be landed, and
sailed back on Vishwa Vijay.

see multi-page detailed description by G.M. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph:
History of Indian Navy 1965-1975: gbook

Later, in 1983, the 340 Army Indpendent brigade based at Trivandrum was
converted into an amphibious assault unit.  and practised regularly for
landing at Andamans and Goa.  The brigade was stationed at Trincomalee and
participated during the entire IPKF operations (1987 jul -1990 mar; 1,115
dead).

MARCOS (Marine Commandos; formerly Indian Marine Special Forces IMSF)

In 1986, the Indian Navy started planning for a special missions force.
Two Navy officers, Lt Arvind Singh and Lt Shamsher Singh Deopa attended an US
Navy commando SEALS course at Coronado, California.  During the Sri Lanka
operations,

Lt. Arvind Singh, (who had been the PGM cadet in his 1980 batch), led one of
the first IMSF operations in a daring assault on the Jaffna jetty, where a
number of LTTE speedboats were moored.   At night on 21 Oct, 1987, Singh
and 18 IMSF commandos went into Jaffna harbour in two Gemini rafts towing two
wooden rafts laden with explosives.  Approaching the channel while avoiding
mines, they shifted to the wooden rafts which they paddled to the jetty and
fixed their demolitions.  Although they were detected, they returned the LTTE
fire and managed to explode the munitions, but half the speedboats remained
undamaged.  Two days later, they returned to finish the job; this time they
swam out more than a kilometer, and managed to plant the munitions.  Again
they were detected but managed to fire back and return without casualties.
In 1988, Singh won the 9th Maha Vir Chakra (and the youngest ever).  The
citation read:

	On the Night of 21/22 October 1987, IMSF team under his leadership
	was tasked to destroy Guru Nagar Jetty and the militant speed Boats
	in the Jaffna Lagoon. The team successfully placed and detonated
	explosive charges and extensively damaged the Jetty and destroyed six
	militant speed boats. In order to destroy the remaining militant
	speed boats, the team reached its destination by swimming over a mile
	underwater and successfully planted demolition charges in 11 speed
	boats, kept ready for the escape of hard core militants. Before the
	charges could be exploded, the team came under heavy fire from the
	militants. Lieutenant Arvind Singh once again effectively took charge
	of the situation and provided diversion by exposing himself to
	militants' fire without regard to his life and personal safety.

The IMSF were also involved after the Maldives government were attacked and
taken hostage by LTTE guerillas in 1988.  p.19

By 1991 the IMSF had expanded to 300 men, all of them airborne-qualified at
Agra and diver-qualified at Cochin.  p.22