topics: |  history | military | india | modern

Are conventional wars an anachronism?

from the vantage point of the 21st century, most military history seems almost anachronistic. conventional warfare seems a distant possibility for most developed nations today - in some sense, even a country like israel does not have normal wars any more... and yet it is india's fate that wars remain a reality for us.

for most armies, war is like an arcade games. you push buttons, you maneuver missiles in distant spaces, and you kill third-world nonentities, who are called "collateral".

perhaps reading this kind of book is an antidote to wars.

Friends at war

there is something medieval - rather gitA-esque - about two buddies, both with long careers in the british indian air force, trying to kill each others' friends in wholesale war.

after the 1965 war started with skirmishes at the rann of kutch, the air chief of pakistan asghar khan called up arjan singh to suggest that both sides keep their air forces out of the conflict so as to prevent escalation in the conflict. and they did.

it appears that asghar khan did this on his own, without talking to the other
chiefs or to commander-in-chief Ayub Khan, and it may have been part
of the reason why he was relieved from his post
a few months later, when pakistani irregulars invaded kashmir in earnest.

the image of fully-grown men maneuvering ships in choppy surf to land a
force of gurkhas - each carrying 40 kg of battle-order armament - into a
remote beach - surely there are better things one can do.

what is impressive in this book, which recounts the 1965 and 1971 wars with
pakistan, is the direct voices of the participants, which does much to
bring you into the heart of the action.

The official history of the Indian Navy

This is the the third volume in the navy's official (declassified) history,
following up on:

	1. Under Two Ensigns, Rear Adm. Satyindra Singh (1945-1950)
	2. Blueprint to Bluewater, Rear Adm. Satyindra Singh (1951-1965)

Subsequently, three further volumes were written by Vice Admiral
G.M. Hiranandani:

	3. Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975
	4. Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976-1990
	5. Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991–2000

This volume starts with WW2, and goes on to describe the 1965 war, which
saw an aggressive plan comprising three major operations by Pakistan.
Surprisingly, Indian intelligence had no inkling about these operations
until they were launched.

There was limited involvement of the Navy, however.

The most interesting parts in the text are during the 1971 war, during which
India scored a number of successes including a missile attack on Karachi, and
blockade of the East Pakistan ports.

The Ukhia amphibious landing failure

An attempt to land an amphibious force at at Ukhia near Cox's Bazar
resulted in an embarrassing failure, with several Gurkha soldiers drowned
because the "landing" (which was taking place with loud music and
fanfare) had been delayed by two hours from plan - so the tide wasn't as
low, and the path to shore lay through waters to deep to walk through.  One
of two landing vessels with 600 troops got broached to, (broadside to
the waves) and was within a whisker of being sunk by the buffeting of the
shore waves.

Fortunately, the Pakistan forces had surrendered in the meanwhile so there
was no shore resistance.  The lead naval officer himself swam ashore and
commandeered some local boats from the mukti bAhini to offload the troops
directly at Cox's Bazar.

What is impressive - by Indian terms - is how this debacle is dealt with
great honesty and at length.  Perhaps this has to do with the widespread
misperceptions of this episode - e.g. the narrative of this event
in Conboy and Hannon's Elite Forces of India and Pakistan
does not mention the fact that the late arrival of the troop carriers
resulted in the landing being attempted two hours past the low tide,
which is claimed in this text as one of the main reasons for the fiasco.

The title "Transition to triumph" refers to the successes of the Navy and
its increased confidence after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, when the Indian
Navy went on the offensive to achieve maritime dominance.  Particularly on
the Eastern theater, the sustained aircraft carrier (Vikrant) operations
against ports and hostile shipping were very effective.

First person voices lend power to the storytelling

Hiranandani (retired Vice Admiral) writes in an energetic style, but most
of his work is in selecting fragments from various narratives penned by the
key participants, whose own voices are the most powerful direct commentary
on the events.  Occasionally of course, these perspectives differ somewhat,
but the reader is usually able to disambiguate the situation.

Thus, while the text is eminently readable and certainly holds interest,
the prose does not flow quite as easily as it might under the highest
level of historical writing as in the work of John Keegan, say
(e.g. The Face of Battle).   But that is
hardly to be expected in what is, in essence, a compilation of first-hand
narratives.

Excerpts

[the first chapter, "1 The Growth of The Navy Till 1965",
opens with a short section on proposals by committees during the late
british era].

ch 1: Expansion during World War 2

during the WW2, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) saw a phenomenal expansion.

	In September 1939, when the Second World War started, the Royal
	Indian Navy had only five sloops, one trawler, one survey ship and
	one patrol craft. It had 114 officers and 1732 ratings, [eighty
	percent of whom were from Punjab and Konkan - abt 75% Muslim and 9%
	Hindu. ]

At the end of the war,

    the Navy had seven sloops, four anti submarine frigates, eight corvettes,
    fourteen minesweepers, sixteen trawlers, one survey ship, two depot
    ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, one hundred and fifty landing craft, two
    hundred harbour craft and forty five harbour defence launches.

    The number of personnel had risen to 3014 officers and 27,433 ratings,
    most of whom served in shore establishments.
    Recruiting pattern: large increase from the Madras and Bengal
    Presidencies and a steep decline.  The intake of Hindus had risen to
    forty two percent and that of Muslims had fallen to thirty five
    percent.

Several new naval base establishments and training establishments had come up
all along the West and East coasts

After partition in August 1947, the RIN comprised:

  - Four Sloops (KISTNA, CAUVERY, JUMNA, SUTLEJ),
  - Two frigates (KUKRI, TIR)
  - One Corvette (ASSAM)...

[It is not clear what happened to the 3, 4, and 7 other vessels present in
1945.  Were these transferred to Britain, or were they just unserviceable?]

ch 3: 1965 War with Pakistan

The 1965 war saw an aggressive plan comprising three major operations by
Pakistan.  There was limited involvement of the Navy, however.

At the time, Nehru had died the last year, and Lal Bahadur Shastri was the
Prime Minister.  Defence Minister was Y B Chavan, and
Swaran Singh served as Foreign Minister.

In the armed forces, we had General J N Chaudhuri as Chief of Army Staff,
with Vice Admiral B S Soman heading the navy and Air Marshal Arjan Singh at
the helm of the air Force.

Rear Admiral BA Samson Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF).

Pakistan's Plan

The picture that emerges from published Pakistani sources and memoirs is of
an aggressive plan comprising three major operations:

a) Operation Desert Hawk: an attack on the Rann of Kutch in early 1965. Kutch
   would be claimed on the grounds that Sind province used to exercise
   administrative control over the area.  The objective would be to draw the
   main Indian forces towards the Rann, so as to leave Punjab and Kashmir
   vulnerable.

b) Operation Gibraltar: Here an attack was to be launched on Kashmir by
   30,000 men with regular troops of the "Azad Kashmir Army" - a part of the
   Pakistan Army, along with Mujahid (volunteers for a jehad) and Razakar
   (defenders of the faith) irregulars.  Commencing in August 1965, a few
   months after Desert Hawk, infiltrators would penetrate sixty locations
   throughout Kashmir and initiate widespread arson,
   destroying bridges etc. Eventually, it would be announced on radio that
   the people of Kashmir had risen in revolt, leading to the formation of a
   National Government. All the while, the Pakistan Government would deny any
   infiltration.

c) Operation Grand Slam.  This would be a large scale attack into the Chamb
   area in order to capture Akhnoor and cut India's only road link with
   Kashmir. The Army would launch a massive attack with Patton tanks on
   Punjab to capture Amritsar and as much Indian territory as possible for
   eventual exchange after the cease fire.

The response from the Indian side was mired in political and systemic
indecision.   There was a strong desire to avoid escalation.

The Intrusion in KUTCH - Operation Desert Hawk - April 1965

The Rann of Kutch is a marshy area about 300 miles long and 50 miles wide on
the western seaboard of India. The incident started in January 1965 with
Pakistan claiming the entire Rann of Kutch on the grounds that Sind, one of
Pakistan's provinces, used to exercise administrative control over the area
during the British period. This was one of the many undemarcated areas
pending since partition in 1947. Pakistan was keen to have at least the
northern portion of the Rann, which it had earmarked for offshore drilling
with the help of an American oil company. India asserted that Kanjarkot,
Chadbet and Biarbet, which Pakistan claimed, belonged to India and not to
Pakistan.

Operation Desert Hawk started with skirmishes between Indian police patrols
and Pakistani border guards about an eighteen mile track, a mile and a half
inside Indian territory where Pakistani forces established two posts. By
early April, the fighting had spread to within 10 miles of the fort at
Kanjarkot. On 9 April, Pakistan forces in brigade strength attacked the
Central Reserve Police manned Sardar post near the old ruined fort of
Kanjarkot. The CRPF contingent was forced to withdraw. The task of sanitising
the area was then taken over by the Army. The Indian Army asked the Pakistan
Army to vacate Kanjarkot. The Pakistan Army refused. On 16 April, Pakistan
claimed Kanjarkot to be Pakistan territory. On 24 April, Pakistan launched a
division size attack, using Patton tanks and field guns. The attack was
contained with considerable casualties on both sides. When the incident had
started, the British Prime Minister initiated moves to secure a
cease-fire. During the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in London,
he succeeded in his efforts. A simple cease fire was declared on 29 April. On
15 June fighting erupted again. On 30 June, a formal cease fire was signed in
London restoring India's police control over the disputed areas while
allowing the Pakistan police the use of the disputed track.

Both the national and the international press commented adversely on the
performance of the Indian troops. Though the Army did nor fare as badly as
Pakistan claimed, Pakistan did make local gains. Logistics favoured
Pakistan. It had an airfield at Badin where it had deployed F 86 Sabre
fighter aircraft. And Pakistan had deployed its Army in force - an infantry
division and two regiments of tanks, including the Patton tanks recently
received from America. India protested to America against the use of these
American supplied arms and America protested to Pakistan. Nothing much
happened.

Asghar Khan and Arjan Singh

Mr C P Srivastava's memoirs state: (ibid Page 199)

   Why was air power not deployed in the Rann of Kutch conflict? Air Chief
   Marshal Arjan Singh told me the reason. He said that soon after the
   commencement of hostilities in the Rann of Kutch region, he received a
   telephone call from Air Marshal Asghar Khan, his counterpart in Pakistan,
   suggesting an informal agreement that neither side should employ the Air
   Force in the conflict. Arjan Singh himself agreed on the wisdom of this
   proposal but he confirmed the arrangement after receiving political
   clearance from the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. Arjan Singh
   was also of the opinion that the Rann of Kutch was not a suitable area
   for large-scale operations by India".

Here, an interesting aside is that asghar khan was a man of unreproachable
integrity:

	When a local lad, who was in the air force, approached Asghar Khan’s
	father to gain a recommendation for a posting to a place of choice,
	Asghar Khan’s father knew who to approach.  A retired brigadier, he
	called up President Ayub Khan to request Asghar Khan, his son, to
	comply with the request.  Ayub Khan did, which Asghar Khan
	refused. The consequence: Asghar Khan stopped all communication with
	his father till a long time after. They don’t make them like that,
	anymore.

		- Vice Air Marshal (pak) Shahzad Chaudhry Nov 2012
		  http://tribune.com.pk/story/458840/the-military-military-divide/


   Shastri was a man of peace and he was determined to go to the farthest
   extent possible, consistent with national security and honour, to maintain
   peace with Pakistan.

Another consideration seems to have been Prime Minister Shastri's belief
that it would be easier to make up with Pakistan, the people of which were
of the same stock as Indians, than to make up with China. He was in favour
of peace. And if war was forced upon India then, whilst reacting in
whatever manner India thought fit, the conflict should be localised as far
as possible.

The Intrusions in Kashmir - Operation Gibraltar - August 1965

It is clear from Pakistani published sources that in mid May, six weeks before
signing the formal cease fire in London, President Ayub Khan was given a
military presentation on Operation Gibraltar. During the presentation, at his
behest, the assault on Akhnoor was included in Operation Grand Slam. He
accorded approval for Operation Gibraltar to be launched. In end July, he
addressed the Force Commanders of Operation Gibraltar.

The first infiltration across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) started on 1 August
over a 700 kilometer front from Kargil to Chhamb. The Indians as well as the
local Kashmiris were taken by surprise.

Operation Gibraltar commenced on 5 August. Sixty companies of Pakistani armed
personnel in disguise, armed with modern weapons and explosives, infiltrated
across the cease fire line to blow up strategic bridges, raid supply dumps,
kill VIP's and cause arson. On 5 August itself, some infiltrators were
apprehended.

In his foreword to Air Marshal Asghar Khan's book `The First Round', Mr
Altaf Gauhar, then Pakistan's Secretary of Information and Broadcasting
states: (Page xii)

   The truth is that the first four volunteers who were captured by the
   Indians described the whole plan in a broadcast on All India Radio on 8
   August 1965, nearly a month before India crossed the international
   boundary".

On hearing these broadcasts, Pakistan realised that their secret plan was now
open knowledge.

Mr C P Srivastava's memoirs state: (Page 208)

   It was only on 8 August 1965 that more detailed information about
   extensive infiltration by armed men from Pakistan was provided to Prime
   Minister Shastri. He immediately summoned a meeting of the Emergency
   Committee of the Cabinet. The Chief of Army Staff attended this
   meeting. He assured the Prime Minister that the Army and the police were
   in control of the situation, the raiders were being rounded up but further
   sabotage could still occur by the raiders not yet captured. The Prime
   Minister asked the Chief of Army Staff to take whatever action he
   considered necessary to prevent new infiltrations.

   On 9 August, as per its pre-arranged plan, Pakistan announced a rebellion
   in Kashmir and the heroic exploits of the freedom fighters who were
   helping them. It also reported receiving a broadcast, by a secret radio
   station calling itself as the 'Voice of Kashmir', of the setting up of a
   Revolutionary Council to take over all authority in Kashmir. Within days
   however, it became clear to the world that this was a propaganda
   hoax. Soon even Pakistani newspapers ceased further propaganda. By 11
   August, the Pakistan Army realised that Operation Gibraltar had
   flopped. From 15 August onwards, the Pakistan Army stepped up its
   violation of the cease fire line on the Srinagar - Leh road".

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965, stated in his 1972 USI Lecture:

   The firm decision that the Army should cross the Cease Fire Line to root
   out the infiltrator's bases and, in case Pakistan regular forces
   intervened, our forces should be free to retaliate at any suitable place
   of their choice was taken on the night of the 13th August by the Prime
   Minister, when the Defence Minister and certain officials, including the
   Chief of the Army Staff were present. These decisions were taken on the
   request of the Chief of the Army Staff that to check infiltration, the
   infiltrators' bases should be destroyed and in any fight between regular
   forces, the Services should not be restricted. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri
   was anxious to avoid any extension of the conflict but was determined that
   measures to liquidate infiltrators should be pursued vigorously. The Prime
   Minister gave expression publicly to the decision taken at his speech from
   the Red Fort on the 15th August, when he declared that "resort to the
   sword will be met with the sword". And even as the speech was being made,
   our troops occupied certain posts across the Cease Fire Line near Kargil
   and, in the following days, occupied various places across the Cease Fire
   Line, including Haji Pir and destroyed the infiltrators' hideouts. After
   giving the broad directive on the 13th August, the Prime Minister did not
   concern himself with the details of the operations. He left all
   operational decisions to be supervised by the Defence Minister, but I used
   to report to the Prime Minister at his residence every evening the
   progress of the operations.

Sinking of the submarine Ghazi

 
the submarine PNS Ghazi which had been deployed long distance to seek out the
Vikrant, was sunk on Dec 3 at Vishakhapatnam harbour.

the 2500 ton ex-US submarine Diablo, re-named PNS
Ghazi, was fed mis-intelligence that INS Vikrant was at Vizag when it was
actually at a secret cove.  The destroyer INS Rajput, was acting as decoy
for the Vikrant.  As it was speeding out of harbour on 3-4 Dec night, a
violent disturbance was spotted ahead and this ship depth-charged this
area.

It exploded loudly sometime later in the night, perhaps around 0015.

In his book "No Way But Surrender - An Account of the Indo Pakistan War in
the Bay of Bengal 1971", Vice Admiral N Krishnan suggests that this was the
prime reason for the sinking of the Ghazi:

	The RAJPUT sailed before midnight of 3/4 December and, on clearing
	harbour, proceeded along the narrow channel. Having got clear, the
	Commanding Officer saw what he thought was a severe disturbance in
	the water, about half a mile ahead. He rightly assumed that this
	might be a submarine diving. He closed the spot at speed and dropped
	at the position two charges. It has been subsequently established
	that the position where the charges were dropped was so close to the
	position of the wreck of the GHAZI that some damage to the latter is
	a very high probability. The RAJPUT, on completion of her mission,
	proceeded on her course in order to carry out her main mission. A
	little later, a very loud explosion was heard by the Coast Battery
	who reported the same to the Maritime Operations Room. The time of
	this explosion was 0015 hours. The clock recovered from the GHAZI
	showed that it had stopped functioning at the same time. Several
	thousand people waiting to hear the Prime Minister's broadcast to the
	nation also heard the explosion and many came out thinking that it
	was an earthquake. (p. 26+)

	From the position of the rudder of the GHAZI, the extent of damage
	she has suffered, and the notations on charts recovered, the
	situation has been assessed by naval experts as follows:

	The GHAZI had evidently come up to periscope/or surface depth to
	establish her navigational position, an operation which was made
	extremely difficult by the blackout and the switching off of all
	navigational lights. At this point of time, she probably saw or heard
	a destroyer approaching her, almost on a reciprocal course. This is a
	frightening sight at the best of times and she obviously dived in a
	tremendous hurry and at the same time put her rudder hard over in
	order to get away to seaward. It is possible that in her desperate
	crash dive, her nose must have hit the shallow ground hard when she
	bottomed. It seems likely that a fire broke out on board for'd where,
	in all probability, there were mines, in addition to the torpedoes,
	fully armed".

[However, there are some alternate versions to this story, such as that the
Ghazi actually sank on 2nd night.  It is possible that the
INS Rajput had not set sail till past 0015.  However, no one on INS Rajput
appears to have heard the explosion linked to the demise of the Ghazi.

Also the damage to the Ghazi indicate an internal explosion (hull blown
outwards).   It could have been a malfunction of one of the many mines it
was carrying, or a hydrogen explosion.   Hydrogen normally accumulates
during charging and discharging of submarine batteries.]

ch 10: Western operation : Karachi Missile attacks

Though I have excerpted heavily from the Ukhia amphibious assault failure,
this is because this episode is not that well known.  In most other
respects, the Indian Navy acquitted itself rather well on both the Eastern
and Western fronts.

One of the highlights was the unexpected missile attack on Karachi, which was
fraught with uncertainties, but turned out amazingly successful.  Today,
December 4 is celebrated as Navy day to commemmorate the amazingly
successful operation in which the destroyer PNS Khyber, a minesweeper PNS
Muhafiz, and a vessel allegedly carrying arms (Karachi port was otherwise
closed to merchantmen); this ship also had a destroyer escort the Shah
Jehan which was hit and had to be scrapped.  It is widely misrepresented
that the  "killer squadron" also blew up the Keamari Oil tanks, but these
were on fire after an earlier IAF bombing.


(wiki: Operation Trident (1971))

The planning of Operation Trident

from the book "We Dared", by Admiral Kohli (FOCINCWEST), (Pages 36+):

   Karachi was defended by shore based military aircraft. It was essential
   therefore to minimise the possibilities of the boats being attacked from
   the air. It was planned that the attacking force would arrive 150 miles
   from Karachi at sunset, go in at maximum speed during darkness, carry out
   the attack, withdraw at maximum speed and be 150 miles away at
   dawn. Darkness would make it difficult for enemy aircraft to see and
   attack the force.

   There were grave risks in sending the fragile boats to the heavily
   defended port of Karachi. Even if the element of surprise prevented the
   detection of these boats on the approach and whilst launching their
   missiles, they would most certainly be subjected to air and perhaps
   surface attack in the withdrawal phase. One has to imagine the dilemma of
   the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay. On the one hand was the tremendous
   danger to young naval officers and sailors and to many crores worth of
   ships; on the other the Navy had to show its mettle. A calculated risk had
   to be taken. But some losses had to be accepted. All these factors were
   very carefully weighed.

In his book "Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of India", Cdr SD Sinha has
reproduced an interview in which the CNS Admiral Nanda states: (Page 229+)

   We had decided that in the event of a war, we would use the missile
   boats for carrying out an attack on Karachi harbour. There were,
   however, a lot of misgivings about this plan... The C-in-C Western Naval
   Command [Kohli], who was assigned this task, felt that Karachi was a
   very heavily defended port with all ships of the Pakistani Navy
   patrolling outside the harbour, as well as availability of Pakistan air
   cover from the two airfields of Drigh Road and Malir, from where
   Pakistani aircraft could attack our forces. They also had 16 inch gun
   batteries at Manora and Sandspit, which could blast our ships out of the
   water. He also felt that Pakistan had superiority in gun power with
   their destroyers acquired from the British Navy and that it would be a
   suicidal attempt on our part to try and attack Karachi. These views were
   expressed by C-in-C West at a presentation of Cs-in-C of all the three
   services at Delhi.

   I was taken aback at this performance. After the presentation, I called
   him and my Vice Chief and FOCINCEAST to my office and informed him that I
   felt it was unfair on him and the men under his Command to burden them
   with this responsibility if he did not believe in the success of this
   plan. And I said that I was going to see the Defence Minister and request
   him to relieve him of his Command. He replied "I have only given my views
   and I will of course carry out the orders given to me". I was a bit uneasy
   about this and felt that he was trying to evade responsibility.

In retrospect, it is to the credit of both Admirals that they let this
acrimony subside.

Here is a map showing its successful missile attack on Karachi.

Killer missile boats: INS Nirghat, Nipat, Veer

On the afternoon of 4 December, when the Strike Group was on its way to
Karachi, FOCINCWEST sent a signal directing the Petyas and the missile boats
to remain in company throughout.

The Task Group's approach to Karachi was by and large uneventful. Despite
some confusion, contacts detected en route were eventually analysed as
undeserving of missile attack.

When 70 miles south of Karachi, a target was detected to the northwest at a
range of 45 miles. It was classified as a warship. A second target was
detected to the northeast at a range of 42 miles, heading for Karachi. Both
targets were tracked and missiles prepared for launch.

The contact to the northwest was engaged by missile boat NIRGHAT with two
missiles. The target sank. It was later learnt that this was the Pakistan
Navy destroyer KHAIBAR.

The contact to the northeast was engaged by missile boat NIPAT with two
missiles. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was a merchant ship
MV VENUS CHALLENGER.

A third contact appeared to the North. It was engaged by missile boat VEER
with one missile. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was the
Pakistan Navy coastal minesweeper MUHAFIZ.

At this stage of the attack, when there were no contacts on radar, what
should have happened was that all ships of the Task Group should have
continued to close Karachi and, from the predetermined point promulgated by
KILTAN, each missile boat should have fired one more missile at Karachi. This
did not happen. Missile boat NIRGHAT mistook anti aircraft tracer shells and
reported sighting aircraft. Fear of Pakistani air attack sharply
increased. KILTAN's accurate anti aircraft radar also mistook as aircraft the
shells being fired from Karachi's gun defences. It took some time for this
confusion to clear.

Meanwhile K 25, the Commander of the missile boats, told missile boat NIPAT,
in which he was embarked, to fire one of his two remaining missiles towards
Karachi which NIPAT did. K 25 then issued the order for the boats to
withdraw. Due to a fade out in communications, the Commander of the Task
Group in KILTAN did not receive this withdrawal signal. He continued to close
Karachi. When he arrived at the predetermined point, 20 miles south of
Karachi he found himself all alone. Except for missile boat VEER, everybody
else had turned round and was headed back towards Saurashtra at full
speed. Due to a machinery problem, VEER had reduced speed to effect repairs.

When KILTAN turned round to head for home, VEER mistook KILTAN for a
Pakistani warship and almost fired a missile at her. Fortunately
communications and identity were reestablished and a catastrophe averted.

In due course, ships of the Task Group arrived on the Saurashtra Coast in
ones and twos, refuelled on 5 December and arrived in Bombay on 6 December.

[There is a misconception that the missile boats also fired at Karachi land
installations and particularly an oil tank at Keamari.  (e.g.  see
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm which is
cited widely).  However, Hiranandani cites the Pakistani naval history - "The
Story of the Pakistan Navy", which clearly states in describing the first
missile attack on 4 December:

	The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial attack
	earlier in the day at 0830, when two oil tanks at Keamari had caught
	fire.

However, the oil tanks were indeed destroyed in the missile attack of Dec 8.
From the "Story of the Pakistan Navy" (p.352):

   	The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed
   	Manora Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil
   	farm. There was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high that
   	Qamar House-a multi-story building in the city- was clearly
   	visible. The fire caused by the air attack on 4 December had been put
   	out only a day earlier after three days of concerted efforts. Fires
   	once again raged in the oil farm after a short lived respite of a
   	day. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone, but particularly for
   	those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the
   	oil farm fires earlier.

	In all probability the first missile had strayed away from its
	target and locked on to the strong echo of the oil tank. ...

	The circumstances surrounding the sudden disappearance of the
	merchant vessel VENUS CHALLENGER from the high seas have remained
	somewhat of a mystery. It is certain though that the ship was sunk in
	one of the two missile attacks at Karachi. The ship, loaded with a
	cargo of rice, had sailed for East Pakistan from the United States on
	10 September. Arriving off Chittagong in late November, she was
	diverted to Karachi where she was expected in the first week of
	December. Thereafter, the ship could not be traced until the
	identification of her wreck by a team of naval divers 26 miles to the
	south of Karachi a few days after the war.

Second missile attack, INS Vinash, december 8

[In this second attack, it turns out that the Pakistan Navy did get some
early intelligence, and it reequested support from the Air Force.  However,
the IAF launched a coordinated attack on the PAF airfields just as the
missile boats were launching their missiles, and the air attack
did not materialize. ]

TRISHUL, TALWAR and VINASH set course for Karachi at high speed. En route,
electronic emissions were detected on a Pakistan Naval frequency which was
being monitored. It was appreciated that a vessel was reporting the
presence of the group to Karachi. The vessel was soon sighted. TALWAR was
told to sink the vessel which she did and rejoined.

During the approach to Karachi, TRISHUL's electronic surveillance reported
that the radar at Karachi had stopped rotating and was pointed directly at
the group, a sure sign that the group had been detected. At 2300, the group
arrived off Karachi and on radar detected a group of ships. FOCWEF had
already told the CO of TRISHUL that VINASH should fire all four
missiles. VINASH proceeded to do so: 

The first missile homed on to the oil tanks at Keamari and started a huge
fire. 

The second and third missiles homed on to merchant ships. It was subsequently
learnt that the British vessel HARMATTON had been damaged and the Panamanian
vessel GULF STAR had sunk.

The fourth missile homed on to the Pakistan Navy's tanker DACCA which had
been camouflaged and anchored amidst the merchant ships because, laden with
oil, she could not seek safety inside Karachi port as the other Pakistan
Naval ships had done.

It had been pre-arranged that the Indian Air Force would attack Karachi's
airfields at Masroor and Drigh Road at the same time as the second missile
attack. It so happened that the TRISHUL group arrived off Karachi and carried
out its attack before the prearranged time. The air attack commenced soon
thereafter. The anti aircraft guns at Karachi opened fire as the TRISHUL
group withdrew unobserved. Post war intelligence indicated that Karachi's
guns set fire to a Greek ship ZOE which Lloyds List of 10 December stated as
"set ablaze and sunk".


[Vice Admiral Gulab Mohanlal Hiranandani, the author, was then
Fleet Operations Officer.  He was awarded the Nausena Medal for his
contribution in the detailed operational planning.]
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/article14650.ece

Review by Rahul Roy-Chaudhury (India Today)

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/book-review-of-transition-to-triumph-history-of-the-indian-navy-1965-1975/1/254619.html

The Indian Navy's proactive role during the Kargil conflict has its origins
in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, when it went on the offensive to achieve
maritime dominance. This took place through the use of ship-launched missiles
against warships off Karachi, and sustained aircraft carrier operations
against ports and hostile shipping in Bangladesh.

This is an honest book. Written by a former vice-chief who helped plan the
missile attacks against Karachi, it does not hesitate to bring out failures
in command during the war nor shortcomings in men and material. These tragic
failures include the loss of the Indian frigate Khukri, the botched
amphibious landing at Ukhia and "friendly fire" from Indian aircraft.

Inexplicably, it does not emphasise the elevation of the naval chief to the
rank of a four-star admiral - equivalent to the other two services - in March
1968. This reflected a notable shift from strictly landward-oriented
threats. Nor does the book examine the nuclear weapon dimensions of the
approach of the US aircraft carrier Enterprise.

Even so, this book is a welcome addition to the scarce literature on the
armed forces.

Author bio : Obituary, 2009

Vice-Admiral Hiranandani cremated with full Naval honours
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/article14650.ece
September 3, 2009

Gulab Mohanlal Hiranandani who died here on Tuesday evening, were consigned
to the flames at `Gurucharan’ premises on the banks of river Pampa at
Malakkara in Pathanamthitta district on Thursday.

The funeral was held at the residential courtyard of his son on the banks of
the Pampa with full naval honours in the presence of Banu Hiranandani, his
wife, Manik Hiranandani, son, Meera Sanyal, daughter, Helen,daughter-in-law,
grand children and other family members.

The 78-year-old former Navy vice-chief who had mentored several generations
of Naval officers was given a gun salute by INS Dronacharya.

Hiranandani served the Navy for a long stint of 40 years. Following this, he
served with distinction at the Union Public Service Commission and retired as
its Acting Chairman. He authored three books on the official history of the
Navy.

He joined the Navy in 1949 and had received training with the Royal Navy
till 1965, specialising in gunnery and missiles.

His senior shore appointments were as Director Combat Policy and Tactics
(1974–77), Chief of Staff Western Naval Command (1981–82), Deputy Chief of
the Naval Staff (1983–84), Commander in Chief Southern Naval Command
(1985–87), and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (1988–89).

He was awarded the Nau Sena Gallantry Medal in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War,
for his role as the architect of the missile boat attack on Karachi harbour,
as Fleet Operations Officer.

In 1979 he was awarded the Ati Vishist Seva Medal for his services as
Director, Combat Policy and Tactics and the Param Vishist Seva Medal in
1986 for re-vitalising the Navy’s training institutions.

After retiring from the Navy in 1989, Hiranandani was appointed Member of
the Union Public Service Commission for six years and retired as its Acting
Chairman.

In 1995, he was appointed the Official Historian of the Navy.

He had authored a trilogy commencing with "Transition to Triumph" covering
the period 1965 to 1975 published in 1999 and "Transition to Eminence"
covering the period 1976 to 1990 published in 2004.

He completed the final chapters of the third volume "Introspection &
Consolidation" just before his death and the book will be released by
President Pratibha Patil on Navy Day on December 4.

Vice-Admiral Hiranandani held a master’s degree in Military Science and a
doctorate in Political Science. His doctoral thesis was "Manning of Future
Hi-Tech Military Systems in India – The Political and Economic Challenge."

Association with Kerala

Admiral Hiranandani had a long association with Kerala. His daughter Meera
Sanyal, who recently stood as an independent candidate for South Mumbai was
born in Cochin when he commanded the Naval Battery INS Dronacharya in 1961.

From 1985-87 he served as Commander-in-Chief of Southern Naval Command where
he initiated the Naval Academy at Ezhimala and the new Indian Naval Base at
Karwar.

His son, Dr. Manik Hiranandani has set up a clinic at Malakarra where he is a
renowned practitioner of integrated medicine.


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fulltext : http://www.goodreads.com/book/photo/8762600-transition-to-triumph