About the Workshop

Computational social choice is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary field that studies problems at the interface of social choice theory and computer science.

Classical social choice theory involves the study of mechanisms for collective decision making that aggregate individual agents' preferences to a collective outcome. Typical examples include voting procedures, protocols for fair division and resource allocation. Much of the important results in the field focus on the existence of procedures for collective decision making which comply with various desirable properties like social optimality, fairness and stability. Computational social choice theory on the other hand, takes into account the computational aspects of these mechanisms. This interdisciplinary interface between classical social choice theory and computer science has facilitated the exchange of ideas and techniques in both directions. There are various instances where computational considerations play a crucial role in social choice theory. Concepts which are well studied in computer science such as algorithm design, complexity analysis and optimization techniques have been effectively used to analyze these aspects. Axiomatic study of social choice situations also benefit from the analysis and structural characterisation results that can be achieved using logical frameworks. On the other hand, techniques and formal models from social choice theory have been effectively used to reason about multi agent systems and in various applications in artificial intelligence.

The aim of this workshop is to bring together researchers from various fields to discuss ideas and problems in social choice theory. This includes computer scientists and researchers in multiagent systems interested in computational issues pertaining to social choice; logicians interested in logical formalisms to axiomatically specify and verify desirable properties in social choice; mathematicians and economists who are interested in structural characterisation results in social choice theory.

Invited Speakers

Image Siddharth Barman (Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore)
Image Ioannis Caragiannis (University of Patras, Greece)
Image Edith Elkind (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
Image Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)
Image Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)


08:50 - 09:00am Opening remarks
09:00 - 10:00am Arunava Sen
Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto Correspondence and a Generalization
10:00 - 11:00am Debasis Mishra
Selling to a naive agent with two rationales
11:00 - 11:30am Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30pm Edith Elkind
Approximating Optimal Social Choice under Metric Preferences
12:30 - 2:00pm Lunch
02:00 - 03:00pm Ioannis Caragiannis
Optimizing voting-like algorithms for peer grading and rating
03:00 - 03:30pm Coffee Break
03:30 - 04:30pm Siddharth Barman
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations


Participants can register for the workshop using the FSTTCS common registration form


Department of Computer Science and Engineering
IIT Kanpur