# Introduction to Blockchain Lecture 1: RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures

Ras Dwivedi

IIT Kanpur

May 21, 2018

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Introduction to Blockchain

May 21, 2018 1 / 23

### Outline










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#### Outline



2 Cryptography



#### 4 HASH function

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• Week 1 (  $21^{st}$  May to  $25^{th}$  May)

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- Week 1 ( 21<sup>st</sup> May to 25<sup>th</sup> May)
  - Blockchain

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  - Blockchain
- Week 2 ( 28<sup>st</sup> May to 1<sup>st</sup> June)

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  - Software Security

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#### Introduction

#### Course Logistic

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- Attendance: Compulsory

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  - Duration: About 30 mins

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- Assignment

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- RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures
- Introduction to Cryptocurrency and Bitcoin

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- RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures
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- RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures
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- Byzantine General Problem


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
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Cryptography

# Cryptography



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#### Cesar Cipher



#### Figure: Cesar Cipher!!

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
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Symmetric key Cryptography

# SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY




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# Public key cryptography



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 $6 = 2 \times 3$ 

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 $6 = 2 \times 3$ 

Convince yourself that factoring is hard!!

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 $6=2\times 3$  Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! 100=

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$$\begin{split} & 6 = 2 \times 3 \\ & \text{Convince yourself that factoring is hard!!} \\ & 100 = 10 \times 10 = 2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \end{split}$$

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 $6=2\times 3$  Convince yourself that factoring is hard!!  $100=10\times 10=2\times 2\times 5\times 5$  299=

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$$\begin{split} & 6=2\times3\\ & \text{Convince yourself that factoring is hard}!!\\ & 100=10\times10=2\times2\times5\times5\\ & 299=13\times23 \end{split}$$

 $\begin{array}{l} 6=2\times 3\\ \text{Convince yourself that factoring is hard!!}\\ 100=10\times 10=2\times 2\times 5\times 5\\ 299=13\times 23\\ 437= \end{array}$ 

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$$\begin{split} & 6=2\times3\\ & \text{Convince yourself that factoring is hard}!!\\ & 100=10\times10=2\times2\times5\times5\\ & 299=13\times23\\ & 437=19\times23 \end{split}$$

 $\begin{array}{l} 6=2\times 3\\ \text{Convince yourself that factoring is hard}!!\\ 100=10\times 10=2\times 2\times 5\times 5\\ 299=13\times 23\\ 437=19\times 23\\ 589=19\times 31\\ \text{So how to use it}? \end{array}$ 

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Fermat's little theorem

 $a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p$ 

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Fermat's little theorem

 $a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p$ p is prime

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#### RS.

### Fermat's little theorem

```
a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p

p is prime

Example

2^4 \% 5 =
```

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# Fermat's little theorem

$$a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p$$
  
 $p$  is prime  
Example  
 $2^4 \%5 = 16\%5 = 1$ 

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### Fermat's little theorem

```
a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p

p is prime

Example

2^4 \ \%5 = 16\%5 = 1

4^{10} \ \%11
```

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### Fermat's little theorem

```
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p is prime

Example

2^4 \ \%5 = 16\%5 = 1

4^{10} \ \%11 = 1048576\%11 = 1
```

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#### • proposed by Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

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- choose two large distinct prime number p, q

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## **RSA**

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- choose e such that  $\gcd(e,\phi)=1$

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- ullet calculate d such that  $d=e^{-1}mod\phi$

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- Idea:  $m^{e \times d} = m^{e^d} = m \mod n$

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- encryption:  $c = m^e \mod n$

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- encryption:  $c = m^e \mod n$
- decryption:  $p = c^d \mod n$

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- choose e such that  $gcd(e, \phi) = 1$
- calculate d such that  $d = e^{-1} mod \phi \longrightarrow e \times d = 1 \mod \phi$
- Idea:  $m^{e \times d} = m^{e^d} = m \mod n$
- encryption:  $c = m^e \mod n$
- decryption:  $p = c^d \mod n$

• *p* = 5,

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• 
$$p = 5, q = 7 p \times q = 35$$

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• 
$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 24 would still work  
•  $e = 11$ ,  $d = 11$   
 $e \times d = 121$   
 $24 \times 5 = 120$   
 $121\%$  24 =1

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$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 24 would still work  
•  $e = 11$ ,  $d = 11$   
 $e \times d = 121$   
 $24 \times 5 = 120$   
 $121\%$  24 =1  
 $m = 2$   
 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 24 would still work  
•  $e = 11$ ,  $d = 11$   
 $e \times d = 121$   
 $24 \times 5 = 120$   
 $121\% 24 = 1$   
 $m = 2$   
 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ ;  $c = 18$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , **but 24 would still work**  
•  $e = 11$ ,  $d = 11$   
 $e \times d = 121$   
 $24 \times 5 = 120$   
 $121\% 24 = 1$   
•  $m = 2$   
 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ ;  $c = 18$  ( $35 \times 58 = 2030$ )  
Decryption  
•  $d = 11$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
,  $q = 7$   $p \times q = 35$   
•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 24 would still work  
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 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ ;  $c = 18$  ( $35 \times 58 = 2030$ )  
Decryption  
 $d = 11$ ,  $c = 18$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
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 $121\% 24 = 1$   
 $m = 2$   
 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ ;  $c = 18$  ( $35 \times 58 = 2030$ )  
Decryption  
 $d = 11$ ,  $c = 18$   
 $m = c^d \mod n$ 

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• 
$$p = 5$$
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 $c = m^e \mod n$   
 $= 2^{11} \mod 35$   
 $c = 2048 \mod 35$ ;  $c = 18$  ( $35 \times 58 = 2030$ )  
Decryption  
•  $d = 11$ ,  $c = 18$   
•  $m = c^d \mod n$   
 $m = 18^{11} \mod 35$   
 $= 64268410079232\%35$ 

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$$p = 5$$
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•  $p - 1 = 4$ ,  $q - 1 = 6$ ,  $\phi = 24$   
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Decryption  
•  $d = 11$ ,  $c = 18$   
•  $m = c^d \mod n$   
 $m = 18^{11} \mod 35$   
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 $= 64268410079232\%35$ 

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● *p* = 7,

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• 
$$p = 7, q = 13$$

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• 
$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13 \ p \times q = 91$ 

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Introduction to Blockchain

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• 
$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13$   $p \times q = 91$   
•  $p - 1 = 6$ ,  $q - 1 = 12$ ,  $\phi = 72$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 72 would still work  
•  $e = 5$ ,  $d = 29$   
 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$ 

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$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13$   $p \times q = 91$   
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 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$   
•  $m - 15$ 

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 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$ 

•  $m = 15 \ c = m^e \ mod \ n$ 

• 
$$p = 7$$
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•  $p - 1 = 6$ ,  $q - 1 = 12$ ,  $\phi = 72$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 72 would still work  
•  $e = 5$ ,  $d = 29$   
 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$   
•  $m = 15 \ c = m^e \ mod \ n$   
 $= 15^5 \ mod \ 91$   
 $c = 759375 \ mod \ 91$ 

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$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13 \ p \times q = 91$   
•  $p - 1 = 6$ ,  $q - 1 = 12$ ,  $\phi = 72$   
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•  $e = 5$ ,  $d = 29$   
 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$   
•  $m = 15 \ c = m^e \ mod \ n$   
 $= 15^5 \ mod \ 91$ 

c = 759375 mod 91; c = 71

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• 
$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13 \ p \times q = 91$   
•  $p - 1 = 6$ ,  $q - 1 = 12$ ,  $\phi = 72$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 72 would still work  
•  $e = 5$ ,  $d = 29$   
 $72 \times 2 = 144$   
 $5 \times 29 = 145$   
 $(145)\%72 == 1$   
•  $m = 15 \ c = m^e \ mod \ n$   
 $= 15^5 \ mod \ 91$   
 $c = 759375 \ mod \ 91$ ;  $c = 71$  Decryption

• 
$$d = 47$$
 ,  $c = 71$ 

• 
$$p = 7$$
,  $q = 13$   $p \times q = 91$   
•  $p - 1 = 6$ ,  $q - 1 = 12$ ,  $\phi = 72$   
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 $= 15^5 \mod 91$   
 $c = 759375 \mod 91$ ;  $c = 71$  Decryption  
•  $d = 47$ ,  $c = 71$ 

• 
$$m = c^d \mod n$$

• 
$$p = 7, q = 13 p \times q = 91$$
  
•  $p - 1 = 6, q - 1 = 12, \phi = 72$   
**Oops!**  $\phi = 12$ , but 72 would still work  
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 $= 15^5 \mod 91$   
 $c = 759375 \mod 91$ ;  $c = 71$  Decryption  
•  $d = 47, c = 71$   
•  $m = c^d \mod n$   
 $m = 71^{29} \mod 91$ 

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 $= 15^5 \mod 91$   
 $c = 759375 \mod 91$ ;  $c = 71$  Decryption  
•  $d = 47, c = 71$   
•  $m = c^d \mod n$   
 $m = 71^{29} \mod 91$ 

485838707624806667708811381704053376792688975925323431%91

m = 15

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#### • AIM: Convince everybody that Alice have signed the document

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- for document *m* Alice uses  $s = m^d$  as her digital signature. To verify, verifier calculates  $s^e$  and if  $m = s^e \mod n$ , signature is genuine

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- d is called Alice's secret key and e is called Alice's Public key

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- d is called Alice's secret key and e is called Alice's Public key

## Is the Scheme secure?

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# Is the Scheme secure?

No!

Ras Dwivedi (IIT Kanpur)

Introduction to Blockchain

May 21, 2018 18 / 23

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#### Is the Scheme secure?

#### No!

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RSA

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#### What could we do now?

### Outline









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An Ideal Hash function is one which has following properties
given f(x) it is impossible to guess x

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• it is impossible to find  $x_1, x_2$ , such that  $x_1 \neq x_2$  and  $f(x_1) = f(x_2)$ Lets understand by example

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• it is impossible to find  $x_1, x_2$ , such that  $x_1 \neq x_2$  and  $f(x_1) = f(x_2)$ Difference between  $2^{nd}$  and  $3^{rd}$  condition?

Need of Padding message m?

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Need of Padding message m?

• *m* is prefix of *PAD*(*m*)

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Need of Padding message m?

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