# Introduction to Blockchain <br> Lecture 1: RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures 

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IIT Kanpur

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## Outline

(1) Introduction
(2) Cryptography
(3) RSA
(4) HASH function

## Outline

(1) Introduction

## (2) Cryptography

## Course Logistic

- Week 1 ( $21^{\text {st }}$ May to $25^{\text {th }}$ May)


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- Week 2 ( $28^{\text {st }}$ May to $1^{\text {st }}$ June)


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- Software Security


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- Software Security
- Attendance: Compulsory


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- 1 on $1^{\text {st }}$ June
- Would have questions from both the section


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- 1 on $1^{\text {st }}$ June
- Would have questions from both the section
- Duration: About 30 mins


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- Assignment


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- Mandatory to pass the quiz
- Assignment
- Would not be graded


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## Blockchain

## Blockchain

- RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures


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- RSA, SHA and Digital Signatures
- Introduction to Cryptocurrency and Bitcoin


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- Byzantine General Problem


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## Outline

## (1) Introduction

## (2) Cryptography

## Cryptography



## Cesar Cipher



Figure: Cesar Cipher!!

RAS - > UDV

## Symmetric key Cryptography

## SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY



## Public key cryptography



## Outline

## (1) Introduction

(2) Cryptography
(3) RSA

## (4) HASH function

## Factoring is hard

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$$
6=2 \times 3
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
6=2 \times 3
$$

Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! $100=$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& 100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& 100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \\
& 299=
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& \begin{array}{l}
100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \\
299=13 \times 23
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& 100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \\
& 299=13 \times 23 \\
& 437=
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& \begin{array}{l}
100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \\
299=13 \times 23 \\
437=19 \times 23
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Factoring is hard

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 6=2 \times 3 \\
& \text { Convince yourself that factoring is hard!! } \\
& 100=10 \times 10=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \\
& 299=13 \times 23 \\
& 437=19 \times 23 \\
& 589=19 \times 31 \\
& \text { So how to use it? }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Fermat's little theorem

$$
a^{p-1}=1 \text { modulo } p
$$

## Fermat's little theorem

$a^{p-1}=1$ modulo $p$
$p$ is prime

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Example
$2^{4} \% 5=$

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$a^{p-1}=1$ modulo $p$
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Example
$2^{4} \% 5=16 \% 5=1$

## Fermat's little theorem

$$
\begin{aligned}
& a^{p-1}=1 \text { modulo } p \\
& p \text { is prime } \\
& \text { Example } \\
& 2^{4} \% 5=16 \% 5=1 \\
& 4^{10} \% 11
\end{aligned}
$$

## Fermat's little theorem

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& a^{p-1}=1 \text { modulo } p \\
& p \text { is prime } \\
& \text { Example } \\
& 2^{4} \% 5=16 \% 5=1 \\
& 4^{10} \% 11=1048576 \% 11=1
\end{aligned}
$$

RSA

RSA

- proposed by Rivest,Shamir,Adleman
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- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
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- calculate $n=p q$
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- calculate $\phi=\operatorname{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$


## RSA

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- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
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## RSA

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- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
- calculate $n=p q$
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- calculate $d$ such that $d=e^{-1} \bmod \phi$
- proposed by Rivest,Shamir,Adleman
- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
- calculate $n=p q$
- calculate $\phi=\operatorname{Icm}(p-1, q-1)$
- choose e such that $\operatorname{gcd}(e, \phi)=1$
- calculate $d$ such that $d=e^{-1} \bmod \phi \longrightarrow e \times d=1 \bmod \phi$
- proposed by Rivest,Shamir,Adleman
- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
- calculate $n=p q$
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- calculate $d$ such that $d=e^{-1} \bmod \phi \longrightarrow e \times d=1 \bmod \phi$
- Idea: $m^{e \times d}=m^{e^{d}}=m$ modulo $n$
- proposed by Rivest,Shamir,Adleman
- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
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- encryption: $c=m^{e} \bmod n$
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- calculate $\phi=\operatorname{Icm}(p-1, q-1)$
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- encryption: $c=m^{e} \bmod n$
- decryption: $p=c^{d} \bmod n$
- proposed by Rivest,Shamir,Adleman
- choose two large distinct prime number $p, q$
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- Idea: $m^{e \times d}=m^{e^{d}}=m$ modulo $n$
- encryption: $c=m^{e} \bmod n$
- decryption: $p=c^{d} \bmod n$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5$,


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
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Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$


## RSA: Example

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$e \times d=121$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$
- $m=2$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$
- $m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$
$m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$
$m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35 ; c=18$


## RSA: Example

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- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
$121 \% 24=1$
$m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35 ; c=18(35 \times 58=2030)$
Decryption
- $d=11$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
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$m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35 ; c=18(35 \times 58=2030)$
Decryption
- $d=11, c=18$


## RSA: Example

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- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

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- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
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$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35 ; c=18(35 \times 58=2030)$
Decryption
- $d=11, c=18$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
$24 \times 5=120$
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$m=2$
$c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=2^{11} \bmod 35$
$c=2048 \bmod 35 ; c=18(35 \times 58=2030)$
Decryption
- $d=11, c=18$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$
$m=18^{11} \bmod 35$
$=64268410079232 \% 35$


## RSA: Example

- $p=5, q=7 p \times q=35$
- $p-1=4, q-1=6, \phi=24$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 24 would still work

- $e=11, d=11$
$e \times d=121$
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- $d=11, c=18$
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$e \times d=121$
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Decryption
- $d=11, c=18$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$
$m=18^{11} \bmod 35$
$=64268410079232 \% 35$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7$,


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$
$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

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$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$
$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$
$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
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Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$
$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$
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$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$


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- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

- $e=5, d=29$
$72 \times 2=144$
$5 \times 29=145$
$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$ Decryption
- $d=47$


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- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

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$72 \times 2=144$
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- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$ Decryption
- $d=47, c=71$


## RSA: Example

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- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

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$72 \times 2=144$
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$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$ Decryption
- $d=47, c=71$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$


## RSA: Example

- $p=7, q=13 p \times q=91$
- $p-1=6, q-1=12, \phi=72$

Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

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$(145) \% 72==1$
- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$ Decryption
- $d=47, c=71$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$
$m=71^{29} \bmod 91$
$=$
485838707624806667708811381704053376792688975925323431\%91


## RSA: Example

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Oops! $\phi=12$, but 72 would still work

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- $m=15 c=m^{e} \bmod n$
$=15^{5} \bmod 91$
$c=759375 \bmod 91 ; c=71$ Decryption
- $d=47, c=71$
- $m=c^{d} \bmod n$
$m=71^{29} \bmod 91$
$=$
485838707624806667708811381704053376792688975925323431\%91
$m=15$


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What could we do now?

## Outline

## (1) Introduction

(2) Cryptography
(3) RSA

4) HASH function

## SHA: Secure Hash Functions

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Lets understand by example

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