Zizek, Slavoj [Žižek];
Violence: six sideways reflections
Picador, 2008, 262 pages
ISBN 0312427182, 9780312427184
topics: | philosophy | history
Violence is not just the physical forms as in wars or riots or police actions - it is also hidden in every restraint we face while living in civilized society. Zizek disginguishes at three forms of violence:
The last two are both forms of objective violence - this type of violence is inherent to the "normal" state of things.
hence, Zizek argues, objective violence is invisible since it constitutes "the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent." He goes on to compare violence that is systemic as something like the notorious "dark matter" of physics. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be "irrational" explosions of subjective violence. [p.2,preface: The tyrant's bloody robe]. This latter violence, which Zizek likens to 'dark matter' in physics, forms the background to our lives, and is not obvious. Zizek tells the story of liberal-minded aristocrats, who were expelled from the Soviet Union in Lenin's time, were completely taken aback. This latter form of violence is particularly important for third world cultures, as in islamic cultures, for whom protest can become the only meaningful option.
Incidentally, in an incisive analysis of British Rule, the subaltern historian Rudrangshu Mukherjee (Spectre of violence, 1998) deals with the 1857 events at Kanpur. He explains the centuries-long British anger to the event (400 Britishers killed, several million Indian casualties) in terms of a violation of the colonial monopoly on violence inherent to life under a colonial rule that ultimately relies (explicitly) on the sword.
An interesting observation that violence by terrorists arises out of an insecurity. The true fundamentalists are indifferent to you, they may pity you, but they do not hate you.
all authentic fundamentalists, from Tibetan Buddhists to the Amish in the U.S. [exhibit] a deep indifference towards the non-believers' way of life. resentment and envy, the fount of terrorist acts, are absent in their lives. However, this downplays the recourse to group identity which quite likely informs much of this type of extreme action. Although the book starts with a key notion that is fascinating, it weakens its thrust by an excessive emphasis on Russian history and totalitarian tales, an aspect often belaboured in Zizek. Of course, like any Zizek work, an amazingly erudite study. With lots of references to Lacan, of course.
Many of the points made in this volume are reiterated verbatim in Zizek's article on the Hebdo attacks. Slavoj Zizek: Are the worst really full of passionate intensity? Surprisingly, the analysis of the 2005 Paris riots - which I thought was particularly relevant - is not mentioned.
[The invisibility of much violence is illustrated with an opening parable:] There is an old story about a worker suspected of stealing: every evening, as he leaves the factory, the wheelbarrow he rolls in front of him is carefully inspected. The guards can find nothing. It is always empty. Finally, the penny drops: what the worker is stealing are the wheelbarrows themselves . . . p.1 [The public gets inured to violence, even the physical kind, and it becomes invisible. Over the last decade, 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo - mostly political killings. Time magazine ran a cover story in 2006, titled "The Deadliest War in the World," chronicling this state of affairs. But there was no uproar, no one took up on it. Comparatively, The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese. p.3 and yet the U.S. media reproaches the public in foreign countries for not displaying enough sympathy for the victims of the 9/11 attacks... Zizek higlights the nature of violence through a story from his favourite domain - Russian history.
Nikolay Lossky (wiki)
In 1922 the Soviet government organised the forced expulsion of leading anti-communist intellectuals, from philosophers and theologians to economists and historians. They left Russia for Germany on a boat known as the Philosophy Steamer. Prior to his expulsion, Nikolai Lossky, one of those forced into exile, had enjoyed with his family the comfortable life of the haute bourgeoisie, supported by servants and nannies. He simply couldn't understand who would want to destroy his way of life. What had the Losskys and their kind done? His boys and their friends, as they inherited the best of what Russia had to offer, helped fill the world with talk of literature and music and art, and they led gentle lives. What was wrong with that?' While Lossky was without doubt a sincere and benevolent person, really caring for the poor and trying to civilise Russian life, such an attitude betrays a breathtaking insensitivity to the systemic violence that had to go on in order for such a comfortable life to be possible. ... not only direct physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of violence. 9 There was no subjective evil in their life, just the invisible background of this systemic violence. Then suddenly, into this almost Proustian world Leninism broke in. The day Andrei Lossky was born, in May 1917, the family could hear the sound of riderless horses galloping down neighboring Ivanovskaya Street." Such ominous intrusions multiplied. Once, in his school, Lossky's son was brutally taunted by a working-class schoolmate who shouted at him that "the days of him and his family are over now ... " In their benevolent gentle innocence, the Losskys perceived such signs of the forthcoming catastrophe as emerging out of nowhere, as signals of an incomprehensibly malevolent new spirit. What they didn't understand was that in the guise of this irrational subjective violence, they were getting back the message they themselves sent out in its inverted true form. It is this violence which seems to arise "out of nowhere" that, perhaps, fits what Walter Benjamin, in his "Critique of Violence," called pure, divine violence. There is an old joke about a husband who returns home earlier than usual from work and finds his wife in bed with another man. The surprised wife exclaims: "Why have you come back early?" The husband furiously snaps back: "What are you doing in bed with another man?" The wife calmly replies: "I asked you a question first-don't try to squeeze out of it by changing the topic!'. The same goes for violence: the task is precisely to change the topic... 11
The liberal communist (mainstream?) claim is that we can have the global capitalist cake, i.e., thrive as profitable entrepreneurs, and eat it, too, i.e., endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social responsibility and ecological concern. Liberal communists include "Bill Gates and George Soros, the CEOs of Google, IBM, Intel, eBay, as well as their court philosophers, most notably the journalist Thomas Friedman." (p. 16) Points out how their ideology is comparable to that of leftists such as Toni Negri. He focuses on the lingo of the liberal communists, esp. word "smart": The signifier of this new reality in the liberal communist Newspeak is "smart": smart indicates the dynamic and nomadic as against centralised bureaucracy; dialogue and cooperation against hierarchical authority; flexibility against routine; culture and knowledge against old industrial production; spontaneous interaction and autopoiesis against fixed hierarchy. Other terms that are criticized include "frictionless capitalism" (Bill Gates). Gates as the ex-hacker who made it, carries the hacker image. "At the fantasmatic level, the underlying notion here is that Gates is a subversive, marginal hooligan who has taken over and dressed himself up as a respectable chairman." liberal communists are true citizens of the world. They are good people who worry. They worry about populist fundamentalists and irresponsible, greedy capitalist corporations. their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world, though if this makes them more money as a by-product, who's to complain! Bill Gates is already the single greatest benefactor in the history of humanity... The catch, of course, is that in order to give, first you have to take-or, as some would put it, create. p.20 Good old Andrew Carnegie employed a private army brutally to suppress organised labour in his steelworks and then distributed large parts of his wealth to educational, artistic, and humanitarian causes. A man of steel, he proved he had a heart of gold. In the same way, today's liberal communists give away with one hand what they first took with the other. 21 George Soros: financier-philanthropist Soros stands for the most ruthless financial speculative exploitation combined with humanitarian concern about the catastrophic social consequences of an unbridled market economy. Even his daily routine is marked by [this contrast]: half of his working time is devoted to financial speculation and the other half to humanitarian activities - such as providing finance for cultural and democratic activities in post-communist countries, writing essays and books-which ultimately fight the effects of his own speculation. Bill Gates: The cruel businessman destroys or buys out competitors, aims at virtual monopoly, employs all the tricks of the trade to achieve his goals. Meanwhile, the greatest philanthropist in the history of mankind quaintly asks: "What does it serve to have computers, if people do not have enough to eat and are dying of dysentery?" In liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity. Charity is the humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation. In a superego blackmail of gigantic proportions, the developed countries "help" the undeveloped with aid, credits, and so on, and thereby avoid the key issue, namely their complicity in and co-responsibility for the miserable situation of the undeveloped. 22 German post-humanist philosopher Peter Sloterdijk traces the evolution of capitalism ("its immanent self-overcoming"): capitalism culminates when it "creates out of itself its own most radical - and the only fruitful - opposite, totally different from what the classic Left, caught in its miserabilism. was able to dream about."9 His positive mention of Andrew Carnegie shows the way; the sovereign self-negating gesture of the endless accumulation of wealth is to spend this wealth for things beyond price, and outside market circulation: public good, arts and sciences. health, etc. This concluding "sovereign" gesture enables the capitalist to break out of the vicious cycle of endless expanded reproduction, of gaining money in order to earn more money. the paradox: today's capitalism cannot reproduce itself on its own. It needs extra-economic charity to sustain the cycle of social reproduction. 24 [Friedrich Nietzsche perceived] how Western civilisation was moving in the direction of the Last Man, an apathetic creature with no great passion or commitment. Unable to dream, tired of life, he takes no risks, seeking only comfort and security, an expression of tolerance with one another: "A little poison now and then: that makes for pleasant dreams. And much poison at the end, for a pleasant death. They have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night, but they have a regard for health. 'We have discovered happiness,' -say the Last Men, and they blink." [Thus spake Zarathustra. 28 ["What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" -- so asks the Last Man, and blinks. ] the split between First and Third World runs increasingly along the lines of an opposition between leading a long, satisfying life full of material and cultural wealth, and dedicating one's life to some transcendent cause. Isn't this the antagonism between what Nietzsche called "passive" and "active" nihilism? We in the West are the Last Men, immersed in stupid daily pleasures, while the Muslim radicals are ready to risk everything, engaged in the nihilist struggle up to the point of self-destruction. 29
G. K. Chesterton's Father Brown defends commonsense reality in which things are just what they are, 'not bearers of hidden mystical meanings,' "People readily swallow the untested claims of this, that, or the other. It's drowning all your old rationalism and scepticism, it's coming in like a sea; and the name of it is superstition.... It's the first effect of not believing in God that you lose your common sense and can't see things as they are. ... And a dog is an omen, and a cat is a mystery, and a pig is a mascot, and a beetle is a scarab, calling up all the menagerie of polytheism from Egypt and old India; Dog Anubis and great green-eyed Pasht and all the holy howling Bulls of Bashan; reeling back to the bestial gods of the beginning, escaping into elephants and snakes and crocodiles; and all because you are frightened of four words: 'He was made Man.'" - The oracle of the Dog It was thus his very Christianity that made Chesterton prefer prosaic explanations to the all-too-fast resort to supernatural magic. --- We from the First World countries find it more and more difficult even to imagine a public or universal cause for which one would be ready to sacrifice one's life. Indeed, the split between First and Third World runs increasingly along the lines of an opposition between leading a long, satisfying life full of material and cultural wealth, and dedicating one's life to some transcendent cause.
exclusion others from the scope of our ethical concerns... the more universal our explicit ethics is, the more brutal the underlying exclusion... What the Christian all-inclusive attitude (recall St. Paul's famous "there are no men or women, no Jews and Greeks") involves is a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community. In other "particularistic" religions (and even in Islam, in spite of its global expansionism), there is a place for others: they are tolerated, even if they are looked upon with condescension. The Christian motto "All men are brothers," however, also means that those who do not accept brotherhood are not men. 54
[discusses reasons for the islamic reaction to the danish cartoons depicting Muhammad.] Those who understand globalisation as an opportunity for the entire earth to be a unified space of communication, one which brings together all humanity, often fail to notice this dark side of their proposition. Since a Neighbour is, as Freud suspected long ago, primarily a thing, a traumatic intruder, someone whose different way of life (or rather, way of jouissance materialised in its social practices and rituals) disturbs us, throws the balance of our way of life off the rails, when it comes too close, this can also give rise to an aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid of this disturbing intruder. As Peter Sloterdijk put it: "More communication means at first above all more conflict." [14] This is why he is right to claim that the attitude of "understandingeach- other" has to be supplemented by the attitude of "getting-out-of-each-other's-way," by maintaining an appropriate distance, by implementing a new "code of discretion." European civilisation finds it easier to tolerate different ways of life precisely on account of what its critics usually denounce as its weakness and failure, namely the alienation of social life. One of the things alienation means is that distance is woven into the very social texture of everyday life. Even if I live side by side with others, in my normal state I ignore them. I am allowed not to get too close to others. I move in a social space where I interact with others obeying certain external "mechanical" rules, without sharing their inner world. Those who propose the term "Occidentalism" as the counterpart to Edward Said's "Orientalism" are right up to a point: what we get in Muslim countries is a certain ideological vision of the West which distorts Western reality no less, although in a different way, than the Orientalist vision distorts the Orient. What exploded in violence was a web of symbols, images, and attitudes. including Western imperialism. godless materialism. hedonism. and the suffering of Palestinians, and which became attached to the Danish cartoons. As Hegel was already well aware, there is something violent in the very symbolisation of a thing, which equals its mortification. This violence operates at multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated thing, reducing it to a single feature. It dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous. It inserts the thing into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it. When we name gold '"gold," we violently extract a metal from its natural texture, investing into it our dreams of wealth, power, spiritual purity, and so on, which have nothing whatsoever to do with the immediate reality of gold.
background: from 2005 French riots In October and November of 2005, a series of riots by mainly Arab, North African, and black second-generation immigrants occurred in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities,[1][2] involving mainly the burning of cars and public buildings at night, starting on 27 October 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois. Events spread to poor housing projects (the cités HLM) in various parts of France. A state of emergency was declared. The igniting event, according to a NYT report: a group of ten or so friends had been playing football on a nearby field and were returning home when they saw the police patrol. They all fled in different directions to avoid the lengthy questioning that youths in the housing projects say they often face from the police. They say they are required to present identity papers and can be held as long as four hours at the police station, and sometimes their parents must come before the police will release them. --- There were no particular demands made by the protesters in the Paris suburbs. There was only an insistence on reognition, based on a vague, unarticulated ressentiment. Most of those interviewed talked about how unacceptable it was that the then interior minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, had called them "scum." 75 The protesters, although effectively underprivileged and de facto excluded, were in no way living on the edge of starvation. Nor had they been reduced to the level of bare survival. People in much worse material straits, let alone conditions of physical and ideological oppression, had been able to organise themselves into political agencies with clear or even fuzzy agendas. The fact that there was no programme behind the burning Paris suburbs is thus itself a fact to be interpreted. The sad fact that opposition to the system cannot articulate itself in the guise of a realistic alternative, or at least a meaningful utopian project, but only take the shape of a meaningless outburst, is a grave illustration of our predicament. What does our celebrated freedom of choice serve, when the only choice is between playing by the rules and (self-)destructive violence? The protesters' violence was almost exclusively directed against their own. The cars burned and the schools torched were not those of richer neighbourhoods. They were part of the hard-won acquisitions of the very strata from which the protesters originated. 76 What needs to be resisted when faced with the shocking reports and images of the burning Paris suburbs is what I call the hermeneutic temptation: the search for some deeper meaning or message hidden in these outbursts. What is most difficult to accept is precisely the riots' meaninglessness: more than a form of protest, they are what Lacan called a passage a l'acte-an impulsive movement into action which can't be translated into speech or thought and carries with it an intolerable weight of frustration. This bears witness not only to the impotence of the perpetrators, but, even more, to the lack of what cultural analyst Fredric Jameson has called "cognitive mapping," an inability to locate the experience of their situation within a meaningful whole. The Paris outbursts were thus not rooted in any kind of concrete socio-economic protest, still less in an assertion of Islamic fundamentalism. One of the first sites to be burned was a mosque-which is why the Muslim religious bodies immediately condemned the violence. The riots were simply a direct effort to gain visibility. Their actions spoke for them: like it or not, we're here, no matter how much you pretend not to see us. The fact that the violent protesters wanted and demanded to be recognised as full French citizens, of course, signals not only the failure to integrate them, but simultaneously the crisis of the French model of integration into citizenship, with its implicitly racist exclusionary normativeness. ... the protesters' demand to be recognised also implies a rejection of the very framework through which recognition takes place. It is a call for the construction of a new universal framework.
Analysts who were searching the riots for their hidden meaning were missing the obvious. As Marshall McLuhan would have put it, here the medium itself was the message. In the golden era of structuralism, Roman Jakobson deployed the notion of "phatic" function, which he derived from Malinowski's concept of phatic communion, the use of language to maintain a social relation through ritualised formulas such as greetings, chit-chat about the weather, and related formal niceties of social communication. A good structuralist, Jakobson included the means of discontinuing communication: as he put it, the mere purport of prolonging communicative contact suggests the emptiness of such contact. He quotes a dialogue from Dorothy Parker: 78 "Well, here we are," he said. "Here we are," she said, "Aren't we?" "J should say we are," he said. The emptiness of contact thus has a propitious technical function as a test of the system itself: a "Hello, do you hear me?" The phatic function is therefore close to the "meta-linguistic" function: it checks whether the channel is working. Simultaneously, the addresser and the addressee check whether they are using the same code. Is this not exactly what took place in the violent outbursts in the Paris suburbs? Was the basic message not a kind of "Hello, do you hear me?," a testing both of the channel and of the code itself?
The first conclusion to be drawn from the French riots is thus that both conservative and liberal reactions to the unrest clearly fail. CONSERVATIVES: emphasise the clash of civilisations and, predictably, law and order. Immigrants should not abuse our hospitality. They are our guests, so they should respect our customs. Our society has the right to safeguard its unique culture and way of life. There is no excuse for crime and violent behaviour. What young immigrants need is not more social help, but discipline and hard work . . . LEFTIST LIBERALS: , no less predictably, stick to their mantra about neglected social programmes and integration efforts, which have deprived the younger generation of immigrants of any clear economic and social prospects: violent outbursts are their only way to articulate their dissatisfaction.
The Paris riots need to be situated in a series they form with another type of violence - direct terrorist attacks and suicide bombings. In both instances, violence and counter-violence are caught up in a deadly vicious cycle, each generating the very forces it tries to combat. In both cases we are dealing with blind passages a l'acte, where violence is an implicit admission of impotence. The difference is that, in contrast to the Paris outburst, which were a zero-level protest, a violent outburst which wanted nothing, terrorist attacks are carried out on behalf of that absolute meaning provided by religion. Their ultimate target is the entire western godless way of life based on modern science.
Science today effectively does compete with religion, insofar as it serves two properly ideological needs, those for hope and those for censorship, which were traditionally taken care of by religion. To quote John Gray: Science alone has the power to silence heretics. Today it is the only institution that can claim authority. Like the Church in the past, it has the power to destroy, or marginalize, independent thinkers ... From the standpoint of anyone who values freedom of thought, this may be unfortunate, but it is undoubtedly the chief source of science's appeal. For us, science is a refuge from uncertainties, promising - and in some measure delivering - the miracle of freedom from thought, while churches have become sanctuaries for doubt. [4. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 19] We are not talking here about science as such, so the idea of science sustaining "freedom from thought" is not a variation on Heidegger's notion that "science doesn't think." We are talking about the way science functions as a social force, as an ideological institution: at this level, its function is to provide certainty, to be a point of reference on which one can rely, and to provide hope. New technological inventions will help us fight disease, prolong life, and so on. Science is what Lacan called "university discourse" at its purest: knowledge whose "truth" is a Master-Signifier, that is, power. Science and religion have changed places: today, science provides the security religion once guaranteed. In a curious inversion, religion is one of the possible places from which one can deploy critical doubts about today's society. It has become one of the sites of resistance.
William Butler Yeats's "Second Coming" seems perfectly to render our present predicament: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate intensity." This is an excellent description of the current split between anaemic liberals and impassioned fundamentalists. "The best" are no longer able fully to engage, while "the worst" engage in racist, religious, sexist fanaticism. Are the terrorist fundamentalists, be they Christian or Muslim, really fundamentalists in the authentic sense of the term? Do they really believe? What they lack is a feature that is easy to discern in all authentic fundamentalists, from Tibetan Buddhists to the Amish in the U.S.: the absence of resentment and envy, the deep indifference towards the non-believers' way of life. If today's so-called fundamentalists really believe they have found their way to truth, why should they feel threatened by non-believers, why should they envy them? When a Buddhist encounters a Western hedonist, he hardly condemns him. He just benevolently notes that the hedonist's search for happiness is self-defeating. In contrast to true fundamentalists, the terrorist pseudo-fundamentalists are deeply bothered, intrigued, fascinated by the sinful life of the non-believers. One can feel that, in fighting the sinful Other, they are fighting their own temptation. These so-called Christian or Muslim fundamentalists are a disgrace to true fundamentalism. 85 Deep in themselves, terrorist fundamentalists also lack true conviction -their violent outbursts are proof of it. How fragile the belief of a Muslim must be, if he feels threatened by a stupid caricature in a low-circulation Danish newspaper. The fundamentalist Islamic terror is not grounded in the terrorists' conviction of their superiority and in their desire to safeguard their cultural-religious identity from the onslaught of global consumerist civilisation. The problem with fundamentalists is not that we consider them inferior to us, but rather that they themselves secretly consider themselves inferior. This is why our condescending, politically correct assurances that we feel no superiority towards them only make them more furious and feeds their resentment. while they pursue what appear to us to be evil goals with evil means, the very form of their activity meets the highest standard of the good. [altruistic] The problem with human desire is that, as Lacan put it, it is always " desire of the Other" in all the senses of that term: desire for the Other, desire to be desired by the Other, and especially desire for what the Other desires. Recall the passage from Augustine's Confessions, often quoted by Lacan, the scene of a baby jealous of his brother suckling at the mother's breast: I myself have seen and known an infant to be jealous though it could not speak. It became pale, and cast bitter looks on its foster-brother. [Rawlsian Justice - inequalities are admissible only if they are beneficial to the less privileged.] What Rawls doesn't see is how such a society would create conditions for an uncontrolled explosion of ressentiment: in it, I would know that my lower status is fully "justified" and would thus be deprived of the ploy of excusing my failure as the result of social injustice. 88 an anecdote about a Slovene peasant makes this palpably clear. The peasant is given a choice by a good witch. She will either give him one cow and his neighbour two cows, or she'll take one cow from him and two from his neighbour. The peasant immediately chooses the second option. Gore Vidal: "It is not enough for me to win - the other must lose." French Jewish writer, Cecile Winter, proposed a nice mental experiment: imagine Israel as it is, and its trajectory over the last half-century, ignoring the fact that Jews came there stigmatised by the signifier of the absolute victim, and thus beyond moral reproach. What we get, in that case, is a standard story of colonisation. [7. See Alain Badiou and Cecile Winter, Circonstances, Vol. 3, Portees du mot 'Juif', Paris: Leo Scheer, 2005.] The very need to evoke the Holocaust in defence of Israeli acts secretly implies that Israel is committing such horrible crimes that only the absolute trump card of the Holocaust can redeem them. Does this then mean that one should ignore the fact of the Holocaust when dealing with actual politics, since every use of it to legitimise political acts amounts to its obscene instrument alisation?