topics: |  science | philosophy

	Consilience = Literally a jumping together of knowledge by the linking
	of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common
	groundwork for explanation. (page 8)

The jumping-together proposed is, broadly, the combining of the humanities
and science into a single discipline.  Quite controversial, for the subtext
is that in the resulting consilience, the methods of science would prevail.

Other reviews

    William Whewell: “the evidence in favour of our induction is of a much
    higher and more forcible character when it enables us to explain and
    determine [i.e., predict] cases of a kind different from those which were
    contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis. The instances in which
    this have occurred, indeed, impress us with a conviction that the truth
    of our hypothesis is certain” (1858b, pp. 87-8). Whewell called this type
    of evidence a “jumping together” or “consilience” of inductions. An
    induction, which results from the colligation of one class of facts, is
    found also to colligate successfully facts belonging to another
    class. Whewell's notion of consilience is thus related to his view of
    natural classes of objects or events.
    - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whewell/

Wilson rails against "professional atomization," (p.42) which works against
the unification of knowledge.  [e.g. the rigid enforcement of discipline
boundaries in Indian academia]
    "It is therefore not surprising to find physicists who do not know what a
    gene is, and biologists who guess that string theory has something to do
    with violins." p.42.
Science progresses through a tension between those who wish to create smaller
problems (disorder) vs those who wish to unify (order).
Examples of consilience that have happened (more debatable as you go down):
- evolution explains genetics
- chemistry + genetics explains cell behaviour;
- physics: unification of EM and gravity;
- statistical mechanics - gas behaviour explained in terms of atomic theory
- quantum chemistry - prediction of chemical properties from quantum mech
- finally, the mind: 'An organism is a machine, and the laws of physics and
	chemistry ... are enough to do the job, given sufficient time and
	research funding’ [p.99, ch.5]
- consciousness and emotions are brain activity; uncovering these requires
	unifying streams in biology, psychology and philosophy
- aesthetics may also be explained in terms of neurochemistry
- cultural units (memes) control interaction between genes and culture.
- ethics (moral values) are related to genetics
And now we need to unify the humanities.

en route to this grand plan we learn a good bit about the genesis of the very
idea of an unified theory.  The [greek] concept of an intrinsic
orderliness... found its apogee in the Age of Enlightenment, then gradually
was lost in the increasing fragmentation and specialization of knowledge in
the last two centuries.  [Chapters 1 and 2].  Then we come to the mind=brain
hypothesis, [Ch.5/6] and the gene-culture co-evolution which makes humans
"fit" (ch.7/8),
and how this leads to the social siences - sociology, economics, political
science (ch.9), and eventually to the arts, and then ethics and religion
(ch.10 and 11).  Finally, we end with a passionate plea for conservation,
from the multiple perspectives of global warming, social strife (Rwanda), and
of course, bio-diversity (ch.12), a theme expanded on at depth in the Future
of Life(2002).

The aim for natural science to "take over" (or conquer) the
humanities is naturally resisted by humanitarians, while the response from
scientists is less hostile.  Indeed, the philosopher
John Dupre verges on vituperation in his review
(http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5368/1395):

    It is not uncommon for distinguished scientists in the twilight of
    their careers to turn their hand to philosophy. Unfortunately, the
    failures among such endeavors are generally acknowledged to outnumber
    the successes, and Wilson's contribution to the genre must on the whole
    be consigned to the majority.

Wilson's book does not discuss in any serious way the debates about the
unity of science that have concerned philosophers of science over the last
half-century and more.  ... one of the most notorious topics from
Sociobiology, currently inspiring a great deal of work, is the idea that
differences in magnitude of contribution to the reproductive purpose--eggs
are larger than sperm, and females of many species gestate sizable
offspring--will lead to the evolutionary selection of sexually differentiated
behavioral dispositions. Broadly, the idea is that males will pursue the
maximum volume of reproductive output, whereas females will aim to produce a
smaller quantity of high quality offspring. This will lead males to seek as
many mates as possible, while females can be expected to look carefully for a
high quality mate with the resources to spend on her offspring.  ... without
seeing any need to worry about interactions with culture.  ... in fact if
development is a matter of interaction between genes and environment, it is
not clear that any such predictions follow.

The claim that "Rational calculation is based on surges of competing
emotions, whose interplay is resolved by an interaction of hereditary and
environmental factors" (p. 205) strikes me as the sort of thing that could
only seem plausible to someone in the grip of a theory. And the view that
"innovation...is a concrete biological process" illustrates a recurrent
tendency to confuse a statement of the causal conditions of a process with
the analysis of the process itself.

The chapter on ethics and religion is even more perplexing than I have so
far suggested. Wilson sees ethics as involving a fundamental divide between
the transcendentalist (Kant, Moore, and Rawls are some rather heterogeneous
representatives) and the empiricist (represented by the eighteenth-century
moral sense theorists and Wilson), the former but not the latter holding
moral values to be independent of contingent facts about human
nature. Imaginary representatives of these extreme positions are used to
present their arguments, but what actually emerges is a debate almost
entirely concerned with the existence of God. Although Wilson may be right
that "the mélanges of moral reasoning employed by modern societies are...a
mess" (p. 254), he offers nothing likely to ameliorate this situation. The
book concludes with a worthy plea for environmental awareness, but since this
has little connection with the earlier themes I will not discuss it.

The virulent tone of this review seems to be coming from a difference in
fundamental stances.  Dupre is probably one who believes in action resulting
from free will, and hence the inadequacy of the sociobiological argument.

New York Times review: Daniel J. Kevles

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D8143CF935A15757C0A96E958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2

Wilson's case for a universal consilience rests on several interlocking
elements. Genes, themselves biochemical in their operations, arrange for the
structure and development of the human organism; 3,195 of them are known to
be involved in the development of the brain, 50 percent more than in any
other part of the body.

[Quote: The human genome database accumulated in 1995 reveals that the
     brain's structure is prescribed by at least 3,195 distinct genes, 50%
     more than any other organ or tissue (the total # of genes in human
     genome is estimated to be 50K to 100K). p.106, ch.6 Mind]

Some number of genes have been selected over the course of human evolution to
predispose us to particular social behaviors. These genes have coevolved with
our cultural and physical environments, interacting with them through what
Wilson calls "epigenetic rules" that are anchored in neural pathways and in
regularities in mental development that the genes prescribe. Natural
selection has favored the epigenetic rules for behaviors that foster our
survival -- for example, investment in children, status striving, the ability
to recognize and name colors, signaling with facial expressions, like the
smile, and contractual agreement. It has thus created a human nature, the
embodiment in all of us of certain norms of behavior or modes of action that
are the building blocks of culture.

Wilson's sociobiological-cultural claims are, to say the least,
controversial among biologists, and one suspects that he overstates the
consilience of the natural sciences. It is difficult to see, for example, how
particle physics jumps together with organic evolution. Wilson himself
concedes that no one knows much about how genes actually control behavior, or
how neural networks make for perception and knowledge, or how the complex
system of the brain works to create consciousness. He recognizes that culture
has tended to change at an enormously faster pace than genes evolve, which
suggests that culture has an independent dynamic of its own. He acknowledges
that much of his program is speculative; he several times avows disarmingly
that he could be wrong, even praising post-modernists for reminding
scientists like him of that possibility. Yet he is confident enough of his
views to insist that the social sciences and the humanities could well
benefit from what genetics, sociobiology and neurobiology have already begun
to reveal about human attitudes and actions. He holds, for example, that
sociobiologically generated norms must figure in the establishment of ethics,
that explorations of brain function might assist in understanding creativity
and interpreting its products.

Wilson aims most of his animadversions against the social sciences,
charging that parts of them suffer from "ideological commitments," tribal
devotion to past masters, reliance on folk psychology -- indicting them for
being "only slightly advanced over ideas employed by the Greek
philosophers." He expresses grudging admiration for economics, the most
mathematical of the social sciences, saying that it's headed in the right
direction. But he judges that while it has scored some successes, "it is
mostly still irrelevant" because with some exceptions it ignores serious
psychology and biology in analyzing how people behave.

Although Wilson's reach too often exceeds his grasp, he is not entirely
off the mark about the social sciences and the humanities. Some psychologists
and philosophers are seeking ways to incorporate the neural sciences in their
analyses, and some economists are acting to deal with the weaknesses in their
discipline on the biopsychological and environmental fronts. However, even
Wilson's sympathizers might suggest that, given his root social and
environmental concerns, most of his censures are misplaced. What prevents us
from coming to grips with environmental decay or the rest of our social
bedevilments has less to do with a lack of consilience in learning than with
the interplay of interests and power. Wilson hardly touches on such
issues. He writes that "ethics is everything," that what we need is "a
powerful conservation ethic" and that by exploring the biomaterial basis of
ethics, "we should be able to fashion a wiser and more enduring ethical
consensus than has gone before." In the end, "Consilience" is an
evangelical book, an arresting exposition of Wilson's religion of science and
a kind of sermon -- forceful in delivery if shaky in substance -- intended to
assist in the reform of the world.