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A bias in translation?

Arun Shourie's writing is unrestrained in its detail, overwhelming in its erudition, inflammatory in its invective; but most importantly, it holds interest. The contrast with typical secularly "correct" writing is stark. Where the latter descends into one-sided panegyric Shourie lashes out with unsparing factual detail. Of course there were many masjids that were constructed on top of old temples, evidence is presented from but that does not mean that a mob can bring it down. Ancient religious norms may put down their rules about widows, but Shah Bano's civil rights as a citizen of a secular state were certainly violated. The Sikhs were allowed to flourish into criminal activity under the guise of the same secularism. At the same time, Roop Kanwar's sati and similar forces must also be condemned in the same spirit. The tenor is clear in the second sentence of the introduction:

   For three decades after [independence] religion was used most
   ... effectively by the secularists - not those ... who were secular but
   those who appropriated the label." - Introduction

These writings have much relevance in today's troubled atmosphere. In a
postscript written after Babri Masjid, he makes a dire case against our
failure to say the truth, even when it is bitter:

   In the end a mob took the law in its own hands. So that this may not
   become the pattern, all of us must redouble efforts to get the
   institutions working again. Otherwise there will be mobs of many kinds,
   and nothing will survive.

Some, written before the Masjid demolition, are even prescient:

   The attention which normal pleading could not have ever persuaded the
   courts and Government to pay the matter for twenty years, ''dhakka'' has
   persuaded them to pay in just two weeks. That is not a lesson to which
   anyone would be driven. But the courts and the rulers are the ones who
   have driven that lesson home.

If there is a theme that runs through these essays, it is the repeated attack against "counterfeit" secularism.:

   How things have changed in the last fifty years. During the freedom
   struggle, if you looked upon a Muslim as being someone apart, as being
   someone other than just a human being like yourself, the 'progressive' was
   bound to brand you 'communal.' Today unless you look upon the Muslim as
   separate, that is unless you see him as a Muslim rather than as just a
   human being like yourself, the 'progressive' brands you 'communal.' Fifty
   years ago when a Hindi scholar by his deep study perceived and wrote about
   The Essential Unity of All Religions - the title of Bhagwan Das' famous
   work - that was looked upon as humanist scholarship at its best. Today
   when a scholar points to the identity of what is taught in the Granth
   Sahib and what is taught in, say, the Hindu Bhakti tradition, it is taken
   as proof positive of a deep conspiracy to swallow Sikhism.  - p.25

This attack leads to rigorously documented instances where Hindu majority
opinion has been discriminated against:

   And there are double standards. It is progressive to demand that the
   Government appoint trustees to manage the Vishwanath, Tirupati, Nathdwara,
   Guruvayur temples. But it is communal to demand that it do so in the case
   of a Gurdwara, even when the SGPC has run away from its responsibility
   under the law. It is progressive to denounce, say, the RSS for holding
   shakhas. But it is communal to do so much as draw attention to the fact
   that the official budget of the SGPC - a body consitituted under our
   secular laws, elections to which are held under the supervision of (and at
   the expenses of) our secular Government - has 'training in arms' as one of
   the heads of expenditure.

Most of the rhetoric is aimed at the "concessions" that were accorded to the
minority religions, particularly the Muslims. The thesis is that most of
these concessions violate the spirit of secularism, and what is worse, they
do not help the lay person within the minority community.

In writing of this kind, one treads a fine line between partisan rhetoric and
objective fact. How well has Arun Shourie succeeded in this? In my opinion,
he has not succeeded too well, for much of the writing appears to bear a
distinctly partisan emphasis. At the same time, the very fact that a leading
intellectual has investigated these issues at such depth is to be lauded, and
we thank Mr. Shourie for having brought to our notice the many facts and
details that are missing in the common "secular" discourse.

The western influence

The concept of secularism evolved as a conflict between church and state in
the west. Much of it has had a tendency to denigrate the older
religions. This has kept us from digging for reality, it has caused us to
escape our identity, our traditions.

   The first is the ignorance of our traditions.  The western educated
   Indian has merely internalized the sophisticated, indeed subversive
   slander of Western scholars about his texts, beliefs, practices. Much of
   this scholarship was associated with - much of it directly arose from -
   the need to justify the notion that the East has to be 'civilized'; by
   missionary activity, by imperial conquest... we have internalized three
   notions from it: that by and large our tradition is pessimistic, it is
   life-denying; that our present condition ... originates in this
   tradition; finally, that we are not one stream but an artificial
   geographical construct, that the Sikhs, Muslims, Hindus, etc, are
   inherently irreconcilably separate. p.25-26

Actually, the problem is not with the concept of secularism, but with its
implementation.

   We are not up against an ephemeral rash, the problem is not just one or
   two madmen who have seen an opportunity in religion for advancing
   themselves. The problem has to do with the structure of our society and
   the transition to modernisation. It will accordingly be with us for
   decades, and the troubles it has caused us are but a preview of the
   havoc that, unattended, it is certain to cause. What then must be done?
   ..

   Our laws do not discriminate between individuals on grounds of
   religion. These are the corner-stones of a secular state. But in view of
   recent events, the state must be scrupulously fair. It must also be
   absolutely firm. When, confronted by a Bhindranwale, it flounders, it
   breeds terrorists. In the same way, when following the massacre of 2700
   sikhs in the capital, it does not bring the guilty to book, it breeds
   terrorists.

   ... Furthermore, given the authority `religious' leaders claim for
   themselves on `religious' matters, we must circumscribe the ambit of what
   is religious matter, limiting it to purely self-regarding actions, and
   even among those to actions of a spiritual kind. `But that was our
   personal fight,' a leader of the extremists in Punjab said in talking
   about the Bhindranwale-Nirankari killings. `Why did he [a journalist], why
   did the Government step in?' But killing others, even if it be from purely
   religious zeal, is not a self-regarding action. p.30-31

The effect of pampering to these religious leaders is insidious - they
often deny the majority much of their dues in the interests of preserving
their own position.

   Concessions that are made ostensibly to the group are gobbled up by the
   better-off, the better-organized within the group. these sections become
   the brokers. Their power in turn rests on the fact that the State deals
   with the group only through them. ... Thinking in terms of groups rather
   than individuals perpetuates the tyranny of the leaders of the group on
   its members - of the Syedna on the Bohras... of Muslim men on Muslim
   women, of landowning Thakurs on landless Harijans. Indeed it gives the
   oppressing leaders and sections a shield. The moment anyone from outside
   the group speaks on behalf of the oppressed, he is denounced for
   interfering in the 'internal affairs' of the group... The principal losers
   are the members of the group itself.

Religious texts cananot be taken "literally"

The central thesis of much of his argument on religion is that the religious
texts, supposedly handed down directly from God, are full of
self-contradictions and contemporaneous misconceptions. As a result most
modern interpretations do not accept the words of God as being "literal" any
more.

The secular attitude to all texts "can only be" that a) each book is
man-made, b) each book has much that is of value, and also much that is
not, c) anyone has the right to study and interpret each book, and d) our
surest guide in religious matters is direct experience and not the diktat
of some intermediary.

   Because of the nature of the Hindu tradition, because of the special
   position that the mystic - to whom books are nothing, and direct
   perception everything - has had in it ... - these propositions are well
   accepted in relation to the Hindu texts. The humanist and secularist must
   extend them to other texts too. It is only when we acquire this freedom in
   relation to a Book that we can benefit from it.

Contradictions in the New Testament

As an example of self-contradictions in religious texts, Mr. Shourie cites
several known instances from the Bible; even a fact as central as the last
supper or the resurrection are contradicted:

   On Matthew's reckoning David is followed seriatim by twenty-five heirs -
   whom he lists - before we get to Joseph. On Luke's by forty. And apart
   from the first and the last names in the series, i.e. David and Joseph,
   our authors have not one name in common. ... In Mark and Luke, Jesus tells
   the disciples in a general way that one of them will betray him, one who
   is at the table with him, who is eating with him (Mark 14.17-21). In
   Matthew he is a bit more specific but not entirely so: when Judas asks
   him, 'Is it I Master?' Jesus answers, 'You have said so.' (Luke,
   26.25). But in John, Jesus identifies Judas clearly and specifically (John
   14.21-6) ... In Matthew (27.32), Mark (15.21) and Luke (23.26), Simon of
   Cyrene is compelled to carry the cross on which Jesus is to be
   crucified. In John (19.17) Jesus is made to carry it himself.

   "Matthew (27.46-50) and Mark (15.33-08) both report Jesus as crying out in
   a loud voice, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' And after
   crying out once again, breathing his last. These words do not occur in
   Luke and John at all. ... Instead Luke reports Jesus as saying first,
   'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.' [After some
   interaction with the thieves on either side] Luke (23.44-54) reports Jesus
   as crying out in a loud voice ... 'Father, into thy hands I commit my
   spirit." And with this he breathes his last. In John, [he speaks to Mary
   and a disciple, and then] he says, 'It is finished,' bows his head and
   gives up the spirit.

[In private conversation, quoted Thomas Aquinas' book - the Age of
Reason, as having mentioned some of these contradictions in the 17th c.]

While the Bible is definitely unclear about many such important points, the
Quran, in its reference to Jesus, denies two important facts: that he was the
son of God, and that he was crucified. The devout Christian and devout Muslim
are unlikely to be convinced by each others arguments on either point.

   Are the `reasons' of the Quran as much as the Bible not something else
   altogether? The Bible must affirm that Jesus is the Son of God so as to
   exalt him to his unique position. For exactly the same reason, the Quran
   must insist that he was not the Son of God, for the same reason it must
   deny the central event of Christian martyrology, namely, that Christ was
   crucified. If it accepts these affirmations it cannot create for Mohammed
   the unique position it must, if it is to found an entire religion on the
   latter.

Thus, believing in each others "God-given" texts can lead to no compromise,
let alone any understanding.

Muslim personal law (Shah Bano case: Your wives are your field)

   ... The fundamentalists are right: in asking the husband of the
   70-year-old Shah Bano to pay her a maintenance allowance, the Supreme
   Court has gone contrary to Muslim personal law. But that is a reason not
   for reversing the verdict: it is a reason for re-examining Muslim personal
   law in the light of modern, secular principles. p.200

With this Shourie launches into a typically detailed investigation of the
origins of Muslim law. It is derived from four sources: The Quran, the sunna
(practice of the prophet as described in the hadis); Ijma, that is, consensus
(among whom? this question remains unsettled); and qiyas, that is, reasoning
by analogy.

In the second category, Six hadis are regards as canonical. Shourie goes into
depth into the two major ones - Sahih al-Bukhari, and Sahih Muslim. In Muslim
law, the hadis are treated as the equal of the Quran. The Ijma, on the other
hand, was originally very active, leading to nineteen schools of law, and
then to four. However, it also left the door open to disputations, to
dangerous free-thinking. Thus, over the centuries, Ijma was narrowed down to
mean not the consensus of the community, but of the jurists, and finally that
of the mujtahids, those that strive, and then to established traditions not
amenable to any form of consensus today. A similar notion, Ijtihad (the right
to interpretation) gave way to taqlid, the practice of abiding literally to
the interpretations of the learned and the Qazis.

The contradictions and ambiguities in Muslim law are examined in detail,
including a large section on the rules of interest. The letter of the Quran
prohibits interest, yet this was flagrantly flouted in the spirit; in the
the practice of double sale for instance (baytan fi bay's) where I
sell you a slave for X and you sell him back to me for X+ some amount,
a transaction known as mukhatara or ina (p.210). The form of
punishment also goes in for detailed analysis, including the famous
lines:

	A life for a life, an eye for an eye,
	a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear,
	a tooth for a tooth, and for wound
	retaliation;	(Quran 5.49)

which is cited along with several others in this vein (Whoso commits
aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him, 2.190),
which runs counter to the principles of the state's function in
enforcing criminal law.

An uniform civil code

The argument to which all this discussion leads is for the doing away of
Muslim Personal Law in all civil matters: this will establish a uniform civil
code in the traditions of true secularism. Examples are cited of many Islamic
countries that are now making changes in the Muslim law. Finally, he
addresses the criticism that he, as a Hindu, has no right to criticize the
internal operations of Islam. Should other religions speak up when it comes
to the religious matters of a different faith? Shourie's answer is a
resounding "Yes," backed up with conviction.

Elsewhere, encountering the Muslim argument that "We haven't interfered in
your sati," he enjoins them that they have not helped by ignoring this act
of "murder", which is as much a Muslim matter as it is Hindu, and until we
can accept this distinction between State and Religion, we have no hopes of
becoming a secular nation.

It is interesting to note here that the traditions of law in Islam predate
that of the West in both extent and in sophistication. However, whereas
Western jurisprudence has been a dynamic tradition, Islamic Shariyaat law has
been frozen, with extremely little scope for modification. The following
claims are made by the most rigid Islamic conservatives (based on a treatise
on the Shariyat Law and its relation to European laws; written by a leader of
the Muslim Brotherhood of pre-Nasser Egypt):

 - Shariyaat is a god-given set of laws, as opposed to the more changeable
   man-made European legal system.

 - Shariyat is complete as it is, and can be neither broken into parts, nor
   added to. The European laws are man made and subject to constant
   rethinking and revision.

 - The objectives of the European legal system is to organize society in a
   stable manner. Consequently, it is being changed constantly as the
   paradigms about society are changing. On the other hand, Shariyat law has
   the objective of creating an ideal society full of people of character, it
   thus needs no change.

The laws of the Shariyat can be amended only in two conditions: when the new
rules are needed purely to implement existing laws, and when new rules are
necessary because of changing times, but even this second category must be in
complete agreement with the Shariyat.

To return to the main argument of Arun Shourie - the necessity of an uniform
civil code - one cannot but agree wholeheartedly. This is perhaps one of the
crying needs of the hour, yet one will have to tread softly and sell the
people on the idea first. The roots of this problem lie within our laws, and
ultimately, in our constitution and our very form of government. We did not
arrive at this government structure through a process of some internal
evolution, but we borrowed it entirely from the democratic traditions of
Europe. A similar theme echoes through the brilliant analysis by Octavio Paz,
Labyrinths of Solitude. The following passage, about Mexico, would apply
equally well here, except that we are perhaps even further behind in our
stage of national evolution:

   Sometimes form chokes us... the liberals tried vainly to force the
   realities of the country into the straitjacket of the constitution of
   1857. The results were the dictatorship of Porforio Diaz and the
   Revolution of 1910. In a certain sense the history of Mexico, like that of
   every Mexican, is a struggle between the forms and formulas that have been
   imposed on us and the explosions with which our individuality avenges
   itself. Form has rarely been an original creation, an equilibrium arrived
   at through our instincts and desires rather than at their expense. On the
   contrary, our moral and juridical forms often conflict with our nature,
   preventing us from expressing ourselves and frustrating our true wishes.
		- Octavio Paz, Labyrinths of solitude

In India as well, we have lost the thread of continuity so critical to our
identity in our headlong transition from feudal past into democratic
present. It is this loss of identity, more than anything else, that has led
to our inability to face reality, and our feeble attempts at a toothless
secularism and a spiritless democracy.

Jihad

A number of sections in the book contain arguments that are weak, and are
bolstered by evidence that is controversial. One of these is the discussion
on Jihad. It is here that we find traces of injudicious quotation, mainly as
a result of differences over translation, that could possibly be cited as
evidence of bias. Early in the Quran, when the nascent Islam is beset with
difficulties, we find:

	O unbelievers,
	I serve not what you serve,
	and you are not serving what I serve...
	To you your religion, and to me my religion! ( Quran 109.1)
Or, as in 2.256 'Let there be no compulsion in religion'. Yet later,
the same voice turns bloodthirsty:
	'If they withdraw not from you, and
	offer you peace, and restrain their hands,
	take them and slay them wherever you come on them;
	against them We have given you a clear authority (4.93)
Or,
	When you encounter the infidels,
	strike off their heads till ye have made
	a great slaughter among them, and
	of the rest made fast the fetters.
	And afterwards let there either be free dismissals or ransomings,
	till the war hath laid down its burdens.  (47.4-5)
The sunnas and the hadis are equally evocative in their support of the
notion of Jihad, which is deemed by Shourie to be the "leitmotiv of
the Quran."  p.229-234

The sunnas and the hadis are equally evocative in their support of the notion
of Jihad, which is deemed by Shourie to be the "leitmotiv of the Quran."
p.229-234.

However, current historical research is unanimous that the notion
of Jihad emerged much after the Quran, during the phase of religious
conflict, particularly during the Crusades. At the same time, if there is a
leitmotiv that runs through the Quran, it is undoubtedly the unity of Allah,
followed by the exhortation to give alms to the poor, a notion that is
repeated times without number.

A question of translation?

Arun Shourie's basic point is well taken: study everything in detail, in its
entirety, and from the original, uncommented text. Then, decide whether or
not the items discovered satisfy secular action or "non-communal
non-interference."

To follow up on this advice, I looked up the original source, the Quran. It
was immediately obvious that the translation used by Shourie was uncharitable
at the very least. Whereas the two other standard translations I found were
largely in agreement, the words used in the above quotations were often often
liable to misinterpretations. The last few lines (47.4) for instance,
consider the word "encounter," which can mean just a meeting, or it can mean
an ongoing conflict. The translation by Ahmed Ali (Oxford University Press,
1984, Rs. 180), puts the same Sura thus:

   When you clash with the unbelievers,
   strike their necks until you overpower them,
   then hold them in bondage.
   Then either free them graciously
   or after taking a ransom.

and the translation by N.J. Dawood (Penguin, 1956) has:

   When you meet the unbelievers in the battlefield strike off their heads
   and, when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly. Then grant
   them their freedom or take ransom from them.

In the translation quoted by Shourie, the sense of "great slaughter" is emphasized though it seems much tamer in the other translations:

   Free dismissals or ransomings, are thus allowed, but after `a great
   slaughter' has been made among them. `It is not fair for any prophet,'
   Allah reiterates, `to have prisoners until he makes a wide slaughter in
   the land (8.67)' - p.234

Yet, this phrase also appears much more benign in other translations -
"... until he has subdued the whole country," writes Ali, whereas Dawood puts
it as "... until he has triumphed in the land." It strikes one as odd that
Shourie does not provide the translation that he used, which he must have
since elsewhere he denies knowledge of Arabic. (NOTE: In a personal message
against this review, Shourie did provide a list of his sources, but still it
is surprising how they are missing in the text itself.)

Choosing such inflammatory translations, and that too without an explicit
source, raises doubts about the authors intent.

Prescription : Make informed decisions

Arun Shourie's basic point is often made: study everything in detail, in
its entirety, and from the original, uncommented text.  (But how many of us
have the wherewithal to look up the originals?)

In other sections of the book, he takes on the legal history of banning a
book on religious grounds; the manipulative and power-hungry character of
Jinnah ("The pistol Jinnah forged"); a hatchet job on Sir Syed Ahmed Khan,
who is typically depicted as a westernized Islamic reformer by biographers
(including Rajmohan Gandhi). In this last article, some of the arguments are
particularly tenuous, and one wonders why such shrill logic would be needed
if indeed the case were so strong. In another article, he describes the
difficulty of locating a particular text that was commended by a noted
scholar some 15 years back, and launches on a conspiracy theory based
entirely on hearsay. The contents, however, are explosive - there is a list
of mosques built by tearing down Hindu temples as compiled by a noted muslim
scholar (the list includes Jama Masjid, Babri Masjid, Qanauj, Benares,
Jaunpur, Mathura, etc.) This list is quoted to emphasize the point, stressed
elsewhere, that the masjids were of course built on temples. What is true is
true. An ostrich like obsession from facing the truth is not going to make it
go away; it will return with a vengeance. Better face it right away and come
up with the correct decisions now rather than later. But what kinds of
decisions can be taken? What are the solution to this Pandora's Box that
Mr. Shourie has thrown open? One is left with no guidance.

What we need, if we accept Arun Shouries cogently argued thesis, is less
bowdlerization, and more direct-from-the-texts-interpretation, be it in the
fields of law, religion, politics, or history. It leaves one wishing merely
for more time, for ars longa, and vita brevis.