Rota, Gian-Carlo; Fabrizio Palombi (ed.);
Indiscrete Thoughts
Birkhauser Boston, 1996, 308 pages
ISBN 0817638660 9780817638665
topics: | math | philosophy | biography
Very well-written memoirs of a leading mathematician, full of acidic observations. Gian-Carlo Rota was born in Italy, where he went to school through the ninth grade. He attended high school in Quito, Ecuador, and entered Princeton University as a freshman in 1950. Three years later, he graduated summa cum laude and went to Yale, where he received a Ph.D. in 1956 with a thesis in functional analysis under the direction ofJ. T. Schwartz. After a position at Harvard, in 1959 he moved to MIT, where he is now professor of mathematics and philosophy.
It is not uncommon for a definition to seem beautiful, especially when it is new. However, mathematicians are reluctant to admit the beauty of a definition; it would be interesting to investigate the reasons for this reluctance. Even when not explicitly acknowledged as such, beautiful definitions give themselves away by the success they meet. A peculiarity of twentieth century mathematics is the appearance of theories where the definitions far exceed the theorems in beauty. The most common instance of beauty in mathematics is a brilliant step in an otherwise undistinguished proof. Every budding mathematician quickly becomes familiar with this instance of mathematical beauty. These instances of mathematical beauty are often independent of each other. A beautiful theorem may not be blessed with an equally beautiful proof; beautiful theorems with ugly proofs frequently occur. When a beautiful theorem is missing a beautiful proof, attempts are made by mathematicians to provide new proofs that will match the beauty of the theorem, with varying success. It is however impossible to find beautiful proofs of theorems that are not beautiful.
[this section became famous after it was referred to in the landmark graphic novel [doxiadis-2009-logicomix-an-epic|Logicomix], where the opening paragraph below is remarked to as a prelude for its theme relating logic with madness. this fulltext can be found at http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/mathoral/pmcxrota.htm It cannot be a complete coincidence that several outstanding logicians of the twentieth century found shelter in asylums at some time in their lives: Cantor, Zermelo, Godel, Peano, and Post are some. Alonzo Church was one of the saner among them, though in some ways his behavior must be classified as strange, even by mathematicians' standards.
He looked like a cross between a panda and a large owl. He spoke softly in complete paragraphs which seemed to have been read out of a book, evenly and slowly enunciated, as by a talking machine. When interrupted, he would pause for an uncomfortably long period to recover the thread of the argument. He never made casual remarks: they did not belong in the baggage of formal logic. For example, he would not say, "It is raining." Such a statement, taken in isolation, makes no sense. (Whether it is actually raining or not does not matter; what matters is consistence). He would say instead, "I must postpone my departure for Nassau Street, inasmuch as it is raining, a fact which I can verify by looking out the window/' (These were not his exact words). Gilbert Ryle has criticized philosophers for testing their theories of language with examples which are never used in ordinary speech. Church's discourse was precisely one such example.
He had unusual working habits. He could be seen in a corridor in Fine Hall at any time of day or night, rather like the Phantom of the Opera. Once, on Christmas day, I decided to go to the Fine Hall library (which was always open) to look up something. I met Church on the stairs. He greeted me without surprise.
He owned a sizable collection of science-fiction novels, most of which looked well thumbed. Each volume was mysteriously marked either with a circle or with a cross. Corrections to wrong page numberings in the table of contents had been penciled into several volumes. His one year course in mathematical logic was one of Princeton University's great offerings. It attracted as many as four students in 1951 (none of them were philosophy students, it must be added, to philosophy's discredit). Every lecture began with a ten-minute ceremony of erasing the blackboard until it was absolutely spotless. We tried to save him the effort by erasing the board before his arrival, but to no avail. The ritual could not be disposed of; often it required water, soap, and brush, and was followed by another ten minutes of total silence while the blackboard was drying. Perhaps he was preparing the lecture while erasing; I don't think so. His lectures hardly needed any preparation. They were a literal repetition of the typewritten text he had written over a period of twenty years, a copy of which was to be found upstairs in the Fine Hall library. (The manuscript's pages had yellowed with the years, and smelled foul. Church's definitive treatise was not published for another five years).1 Occasionally, one of the sentences spoken in class would be at variance with the text upstairs, and he would warn us in advance of the discrepancy between oral and written presentation. For greater precision, everything he said (except some fascinating side excursions which he invariably prefixed by a sentence like, "I will now interrupt and make a meta-mathematical [sic] remark") was carefully written down on the blackboard, in large English-style handwriting, like that of a grade-school teacher, complete with punctuation and paragraphs. Occasionally, he carelessly skipped a letter in a word. At first we pointed out these oversights, but we quickly learned that they would create a slight panic, so we kept our mouths shut. Once he had to use a variant of a previously proved theorem, which differed only by a change of notation. After a moment of silence, he turned to the class and said, "I could simply say likewise,' but I'd better prove it again." It may be asked why anyone would bother to sit in a lecture which was the literal repetition of an available text. Such a question would betray an oversimplified view of what goes on in a classroom. What one really learns in class is what one does not know at the time one is learning. The person lecturing to us was logic incarnate. His pauses, hesitations, emphases, his betrayals of emotion (however rare) and sundry other nonverbal phenomena taught us a lot more logic than any written text could. We learned to think in unison with him as he spoke, as if following the demonstration of a calisthenics instructor. Church's course permanently improved the rigor of our reasoning. The course began with the axioms for the propositional calculus (those of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematical I believe) that take material implication as the only primitive connective. The exercises at the end of the first chapter were mere translations of some identities of naive set theory in terms of material implication. It took me a tremendous effort to prove them, since I was unaware of the fact that one could start with an equivalent set of axioms using "and" and "or" (where the disjunctive normal form provides automatic proofs) and then translate each proof step by step in terms of implication. I went to see Church to discuss my difficulties, and far from giving away the easy solution, he spent hours with me devising direct proofs using implication only. Toward the end of the course I brought to him the sheaf of papers containing the solutions to the problems (all problems he assigned were optional, since they could not logically be made to fit into the formal text). He looked at them as if expecting them, and then pulled out of his drawer a note he had just published in Portugaliae Mathematical where similar problems were posed for "conditional disjunction," a ternary connective he had introduced. Now that I was properly trained, he wanted me to repeat the work with conditional disjunction as the primitive connective. His graduate students had declined a similar request, no doubt because they considered it to be beneath them. Mathematical logic has not been held in high regard at Princeton, then or now. Two minutes before the end of Church's lecture (the course met in the largest classroom in Fine Hall), Lefschetz would begin to peek through the door. He glared at me and the spotless text on the blackboard; sometimes he shook his head to make it clear that he considered me a lost cause. The following class was taught by Kodaira, at that time a recent arrival from Japan, whose work in geometry was revered by everyone in the Princeton main line. The classroom was packed during Kodaira's lecture. Even though his English was atrocious, his lectures were crystal clear. (Among other things, he stuttered. Because of deep-seated prejudices of some of its members, the mathematics department refused to appoint him full-time to the Princeton faculty). I was too young and too shy to have an opinion of my own about Church and mathematical logic. I was in love with the subject, and his course was my first graduate course. I sensed disapproval all around me; only Roger Lyndon (the inventor of spectral sequences), who had been my freshman advisor, encouraged me. Shortly afterward he himself was encouraged to move to Michigan. Fortunately, I had met one of Church's most flamboyant former students, John Kemeny who, having just finished his term as a mathematics instructor, was being eased — by Lefschetz's gentle hand — into the philosophy department. (The following year he left for Dartmouth, where he eventually became president). Kemeny's seminar in the philosophy of science (which that year attracted as many as six students, a record) was refreshing training in basic reasoning. Kemeny was not afraid to appear pedestrian, trivial, or stupid; what mattered was to respect the facts, to draw distinctions even when they clashed with our prejudices, and to avoid black-and- white oversimplifications. Mathematicians have always found Kemeny 's common sense revolting. "There is no reason why a great mathematician should not also be a great bigot," he once said on concluding a discussion whose beginning I have by now forgotten. "Look at your teachers in Fine Hall, at how they treat one of the greatest living mathematicians, Alonzo Church." I left literally speechless. What? These demi-gods of Fine Hall were not perfect beings? I had learned from Kemeny a basic lesson: a good mathematician is not necessarily a "nice guy" [biographical note: Alonzo Church (1903-1995): He invented (discovered?) The Lambda Calculus, proved that Peano Arithmetic was undecidable, and articulated what is now called the Church-Turing Thesis. ]
No one who talked to Lefschetz failed to be struck by his rudeness. He was rude to everyone, even to people who doled out funds in Washington and to mathematicians who were his equals. I recall Lefschetz meeting Zariski, probably in 1957 (while Hironaka was already working on the proof of the resolution of singularities for algebraic varieties). After exchanging with Zariski warm and loud Jewish greetings (in Russian), he proceeded to proclaim loudly (in English) his skepticism on the possibility of resolving singularities for all algebraic varieties. "Ninety percent proved is zero percent proved!" he retorted to Zariski's protestations, as a conversation stopper. He had reacted similarly to several other previous attempts that he had to shoot down. Two years later he was proved wrong. However, he had the satisfaction of having been wrong only once. Solomon Lefschetz was an electrical engineer trained at the Ecole Centrale, one of the lesser of the French grandes ecoles. He came to America probably because, as a Russian-Jewish refugee, he had trouble finding work in France. A few years after arriving in America, an accident deprived him of the use of both hands. At the age of 23, while working as a member of the engineering staff of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company in Pittsburgh, he tragically lost both his hands and forearms due to a transformer explosion. He was fitted with artificial hands worn inside a pair of shiny gloves. Later when he taught, a student would push a piece of chalk into his hand at the beginning of class and remove it at the end. from http://www.robertnowlan.com/pdfs/Lefschetz,%20Solomon.pdf He went back to school and got a quick Ph.D. in mathematics at Clark University (which at that time had a livelier graduate school than it has now). He then accepted instructorships at the Universities of Nebraska and Kansas, the only means he had to survive. For a few harrowing years he worked night and day, publishing several substantial papers a year in topology and algebraic geometry. Most of the ideas of present-day algebraic topology were either invented or developed (following Poincare's lead) by Lefschetz in these papers; his discovery that the work of the Italian algebraic geometers could be recast in topological terms is only slightly less dramatic. His colleagues must have been surprised when Lefschetz himself started to develop anti-Semitic feelings which were still lingering when I was there. One of the first questions he asked me after I met him was whether I was Jewish. In the late thirties and forties, he refused to admit any Jewish graduate students in mathematics. He claimed that, because of the Depression, it was too difficult to get them jobs after they earned their Ph.D.'s. He liked and favored red-blooded American boyish Wasp types ... He despised mathematicians who spent their time giving rigorous or elegant proofs for arguments which he considered obvious. Once, Spencer and Kodaira, still associate professors, proudly explained to him a clever new proof they had found of one of Lefschetz's deeper theorems. "Don't come to me with your pretty proofs! We don't bother with that baby stuff around here!" was his reaction. Nonetheless, from that moment on he held Spencer and Kodaira in high esteem. He liked to repeat, as an example of mathematical pedantry, the story of one of E. H. Moore's visits to Princeton, when Moore started a lecture by saying, "Let a be a point and let b be a point." "But why don't you just say, 'Let a and b be points!'" asked Lefschetz. "Because a may equal b," answered Moore. Lefschetz got up and left the lecture room. Lefschetz was a purely intuitive mathematician. It was said of him that he had never given a completely correct proof, but had never made a wrong guess either. When he was forced to relinquish the chairmanship of the Princeton mathematics department for reasons of age, he decided to promote Mexican mathematics. His love /hate of the Mexicans got him into trouble. Once, in a Mexican train station, he spotted a charro dressed in full regalia, complete with a pair of pistols and rows of cartridges across his chest. He started making fun of the charro's attire, adding some deliberate slurs in his excellent Spanish. His companions feared that the charro might react the way Mexicans traditionally react to insult. The charro eventually stood up and reached for his pistols. Lefschetz looked at him straight in the face and did not back off. There were a few seconds of tense silence. "Gringo loco!" said the charro finally, and walked away. When Lefschetz decided to leave Mexico and come back to the United States, the Mexicans awarded him the Order of the Aztec Eagle. During Lefschetz's tenure as chairman of the mathematics department, Princeton became the world center of mathematics. He had an uncanny instinct for sizing up mathematicians' abilities, and he was invariably right when sizing up someone in a field where he knew next to nothing. In topology, however, his judgment would slip, probably because he became partial to work that he half understood. His standards of accomplishment in mathematics were so high that they spread by contagion to his successors, who maintain them to this day. When addressing an entering class of twelve graduate students, he told them in no uncertain terms, "Since you have been carefully chosen among the most promising undergraduates in mathematics in the country, I expect that you will all receive your Ph.D.'s rather sooner than later. Maybe one or two of you will go on to become mathematicians."
Lefschetz had two artificial hands over which he always wore a shiny black glove. First thing every morning a graduate student had to push a piece of chalk into his hand and remove it at the end of the day. The students at Princeton made up a ditty about Lefschetz:- Here's to Lefschetz, Solomon L. Irrepressible as hell When he's at last beneath the sod He'll then begin to heckle God. For Lefschetz, independent thinking and originality were what mattered in mathematical research. Unlike most mathematicians he had no respect for elegance and if something was to him clearly true, he would consider it at best a waste of time producing a rigorous argument to verify it. When a student proudly showed him a clever argument that he had produced to give a short proof of one of Lefschetz's theorems, rather than compliment the student, he is claimed to have retorted:- Don't come to me with your pretty proofs. We don't bother with that baby stuff around here. Even if there is little truth in a joke which circulated about Lefschetz, namely that he never wrote a correct proof or stated an incorrect theorem, there is an underlying truth in it reflecting on his style of mathematics. Sylvia Nasar gives this vivid description of the impact Lefschetz had on Princeton [17]:- Entrepreneurial and energetic, Lefschetz was the supercharged human locomotive that ... pulled the Princeton department out of genteel mediocrity right to the top. He recruited mathematicians with only one criterion in mind: research. His high-handed and idiosyncratic editorial policies made the Annals of Mathematics, Princeton's once-tired monthly, into the most revered mathematical journal in the world. He was sometimes accused of caving in to anti-Semitism for refusing to admit many Jewish students (his rationale being that nobody would hire them when they completed their degrees), but no one denies that he had brilliant snap judgement. He exhorted, bossed, and bullied, but with the aim of making the department great and turning his students into real mathematicians, tough like himself. He was the editor of the Annals of Mathematics from 1928 to 1958, bringing it up to the standard of one of the very best world class journals.