Hawley, John Charles (ed.);
India in Africa, Africa in India: Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms
Indiana University Press, 2008, 296 pages
ISBN 0253219752, 9780253219756
topics: | history | india | africa | indian-ocean
My opinion is that there are many things we could learn from India and other Asian countries, just as they have much to learn from us.You know, it is thought by some that some Indians are of African descent.I have a theory that the coastline of the Indian Ocean was once a cultural highway with constant migrations and exchange. - Kamıtı, in Ngugı wa Thiong'o's Wizard of the Crow
The essentialist and conventional Western view is that the IOW slave trade was a mirror image, albeit on a smaller scale, of the Atlantic slave trade in which from c.1500 to 1860 some 10–12 million slaves, mostly West African adult males, were shipped to New World mines and plantations, where they constituted the basis of a "slave mode of production." They were a clearly visible Black chattel class of hereditary slave status, uncivilized "outsiders," deprived of civil rights. Violence was a universal and pervasive feature of master- slave relations. Slave own ers controlled the slave's productive and reproductive capacities and could legally punish, sell, or transfer a slave and separate a slave mother from her children or male companion.
However, non-essentialist studies of IOW slavery signal significant divergences from the Atlantic model. They reveal complex trans-IOW slave trades that started well before the Common Era, remained vigorous into the twentieth century, and in some areas are still maintained. In all of these trades, sources, markets, routes, and slave functions varied considerably.
Overall, Black Africans probably formed a minority of slaves traded. Moreover, slaves in the IOW were heavily affected by forces of assimilation and integration that had major repercussions for the identity of slaves and their descendants and thus on the viability of the concept of an African Diaspora. This is most apparent in Islamic communities that dominated vast swathes of the IOW. Recent scholarship has steadily undermined the conventional Western assumption that there existed a specifically "Islamic" form of slavery. Rather, there emerged different schools of legal interpretation, within which individual scholars could differ significantly on the niceties of Islamic law, while the application of the sharia outside the Middle East was tempered by local customs. However, all were characterized by considerable assimilation of slaves into local society.
The IOW slave trade started at least 4,000 years ago, was multidirectional, involved overland and maritime routes, changed over time, and involved many different ethnic groups. In the IOW, "slave" cannot be equated with "African" (Schottenhammer 2004; Wink 1996: 30–31; Goody 1980: 18). In the eastern IOW, African slaves, imported chiefly via the Middle East and Southeast Asia, were a rare luxury. By the second century ce, demand may have developed in China for skilled African sailors and Alexandrian slave jugglers (Van Leur 1955: 99). From the fourth century a regular market existed there for K'un- lun ("Black") slaves (Worden and Ward 1998: 850), but "K'un- lun" could refer specifically to inhabitants of Pemba, in East Africa, and any dark- skinned person from Africa, Papua New Guinea and Melanesia (Filesi 1972: 21; Irwin 1977: 169–72). By the late ninth century, east African slaves were certainly highly esteemed in China as divers to caulk boat seams with oakum, because of their strength and ability to keep their eyes open underwater (Duyvendak 1949: 24; Filesi 1972: 22; Irwin 1977: 171; Hermann 1954: 313). They were also imported as sailors, who possibly helped man the great Chinese navies of the twelfth to early fifteenth centuries (Lo 1955: 500). However, few were employed inland, as is demonstrated by the excitement surrounding the arrival in 976 of a Negro slave accompanying an Arab envoy to the imperial Tang court (Filesi 1972: 4–5; Wallenstein 1998: 177). However, African slaves in the East were always a strict minority. China and other centralized states obtained most of their slaves from the military operations associated with state and empire building (Coedès 1966: 60). Most slaves came from decentralized hill "tribes" and "maritime" communities within the region who were easier to locate than Africans, were cheaper to transport, and suffered fewer losses en route; for instance, in 1684 only 108 of the 278 Malagasy slaves on one ship survived the voyage to Batavia (Arasaratnam 1995: 200). Indonesians were shipped to markets across Southeast Asia and to Cape Town, Indochinese and Koreans were exported to China, and in the nineteenth century, Chinese slaves were sent to Singapore and San Francisco (Campbell 2004, 2005a).
Arab merchants in the third century ce possibly shipped the first African slaves to India, to the Sopara, Kalyan, Chaul, and Pal forts in Konkan (Ricks 1998a: 70, 1998b: 833; Vérin 1999; Kidwai 1990; Trimingham 1964: 2–3; Shirodkar 1985: 28). With the commercial expansion of Islam, demand for African slaves increased, and from the tenth century significant numbers of Berbers, Ethiopians, and sub- Saharan Africans — eyewitnesses from Ibn- Batuta (1342–49) to Tomé Pires (1512–15) emphasize "Abyssinians" (Reinaud 1848: cdxvii; Pires 1944: 51)—were shipped to South Asia. Michel Boivin claims that the majority of slaves in Sind (present- day Pakistan) were Sidi, of east African origin (Boivin 2000), although Salim Kidwai argues that while African slaves predominated in Bengal and South India, Turks and Slavs comprised the majority of slave imports into medieval South Asia (Kidwai 1990: 80–81, 86–88). The Portuguese settlements of Goa, Dui, Daman, and Sri Lanka augmented Indian demand for African slaves, notably from the Mozambique coast. Portuguese and Indian traders initially shared this trade, but it became progressively concentrated in the hands of Indians. Dutch and British posts in Sri Lanka subsequently imported Malagasy and east African slaves directly and indirectly, via Cape Town, Bombay, and Goa. All the while, the traditional African slave import trade via Zebid, Aden, and the Persian Gulf continued to grow. The literature focuses on imported African slaves, but most slaves in South Asia were probably of local origin (Kidwai 1990: 86–88; Miller 2004), while Indian slaves were also shipped to Macao, Japan, Indonesia, Mauritius, and Cape Town. most slaves traded in the IOW were female, notably girls and young women who generally commanded higher prices than male and older female slaves. The exceptions were eunuchs ("males made female"), who were universally highly prized, and boys in China — where patriarchal ideology restricted the supply of boy slaves, whose prices were often four to five times that of girl slaves (Miers 2005; Watson 1980c: 235). p.9 BLACK DEATH (Pasteurella pestis): Eurocentric historiography has focused on the devastation wrought in Europe by the Black Death, but its impact was greater in Asia. The plague first erupted in epidemic form in China in 1331, spreading along the main commercial caravan routes of Asia before reaching the Crimea and Europe in 1346. An estimated 90 per cent of those infected died. While it killed probably one third of Eu ro pe ans in 1346–50, it halved the population of China (to 65 million) and Egypt (to an estimated 2 million). The impact was probably as devastating in centers of population in India and the Middle East (McNeill 1976: 144–49; Ponting 1991: 228–29; Chaudhuri 1992: 381–82).
There also existed strong forces promoting the integration of slaves into the dominant society in many IOW regions where, in contrast to the Atlantic system, most slaves were subject to forces promoting assimilation into local society rather than separation and alienation from it (Campbell 2004: vii–xxxii). In large part, this stemmed from Islamic influence which by the fourteenth century dominated much of the region, from East Africa to Indonesia. The sharia taught that manumission of slave converts was meritorious, slaves could redeem themselves, and children resulting from the sexual union of slave masters and concubines inherited a nonslave status, as did a concubine mother upon the death of her own er. The rate of manumission could theoretically be high; whereas a rich Muslim was legally restricted to four wives, the number of concubines he might possess was unlimited (see Sheriff 2005; Clarence- Smith 2005; Brunschwig 1999; Lewis 1990). Manumission, relatively common where close owner-slave relationships existed, was accorded more readily to domestic slaves than to those employed in activities and areas that separated them from the slave-owning household. Thus under most Islamic slave regimes, the number of manumitted slaves was considerable. Because wealthy and powerful Muslims had more concubines than others, significant numbers of their progeny by slave women became part of the local elite. Many of Mecca's Qurayshī elite were the progeny of Arab males and African concubines, and the three greatest early Arab poets, "Antara bin Shaddād al- Kalbī, Khafāf bin Nudba al- Sulakhī, and Sulayk bin al- Sulaka were known as the "Crows of the Arabs" because they possessed Black mothers (Hassad, Mufuta, and Mutunda) (Ross 1994: 18–19). Similarly, Atā ibn Abī Rabāh, born in Saudi Arabia of Nubian parents, became a celebrated Muslim teacher and jurist at Mecca in the early eighth century (Irwin 1977: 66), while a century later Abū Al- Djāhiz, of probably Ethiopian slave origin, achieved fame and influence in Basra and Baghdad as author of so cio log i cal commentaries, theology, and politico- religious polemics (Pellat 1999a). Again, some Muslim monarchs had African mothers who were publicly revered.
"Hindu" Dance Groups and Indophilie in Senegal: The Imagination of the Exotic Other Not long after I started my quest for dance indou in Dakar, I learned there was a national federation (UNAIS, Union Nationale des Indouphiles au Senega1), grouping over twenty associations of India-lovers throughout Senegal, organizing activities, soirées indous ("Hindu evenings"), and rehearsals. When turning on the radio, one is likely to come across one of the many Hindu programs broadcast almost every day on different radio stations. There is no Indian expatriate community in Senegal which can account for this Indophilie, as is the case in eastern Africa or the Caribbean. Moreover, being a francophone country, one would presume Senegal lies out of the English influence sphere which is much stronger in Anglophone Africa. By analyzing this Senegalese Indophilie we can learn it has its origin in the massive import and immense success of Bollywood films.
In his article "Itineraries of Indian Cinema," Brian Larkin tries to answer the question why Indian films travel. He explains the popularity of this genre throughout the world (in "Third World" countries, with or without an Indian expatriate community, as well as in socialist countries such as Eastern Europe) because it offers a way of being modern that does not necessarily mean being Western (Larkin 2003: 172; 1997: 407). In northern Nigeria, where his own research is focused, it is also a way of distinguishing themselves from the south, which is much more oriented toward the West. Thus these transnational cultural flows become "a foil against which postcolonial identity can be fashioned, critiqued, and debated. They allow an alterity to Hollywood domination" (2003: 178). Following Larkin, this is not to say the story of Africans turning toward Bollywood films is a discourse of "local" resistance to "dominant" Western culture (1997: 408, 433). Arabic and Bollywood films were first imported by Lebanese cinema owners in the 1950s, who thought Arabic films would become very popular in African Islamic countries (Larkin 2003: 181; 1997: 411).8 Bollywood, however, turned out to have a much bigger success. Lots of Hausa state "Indian culture" (at least how it is presented in the films) is "just like" Hausa culture (Larkin 2003: 183; 1997: 411, 433). In Senegal, the same explanation is heard. According to Larkin, the popularity of Indian films among Hausa rests, in part, on this dialectic of sameness ("just like" and difference (2003: 183; 1997: 414). Characters in Indian films struggle over whether they should speak Hindi or borrow from English, whether they should marry the person they love or wed the person their parents choose, elements which are very relevant for Hausa viewers (1997: 410). Senegal: Many elements pointed out for Nigeria by Larkin also hold true for Senegal. According to my research participants, the first Bollywood films appeared in Senegalese cinemas around the 1950s and were an immense success. They soon became much more popular than Arabic films and were shown daily in most of the urban cinemas. Some research participants said this is because Arabic film is too "Western" or has fewer song-and- dance sequences which are typical for Bollywood. But why do Indian movies appeal to a Senegalese audience? Most Bollywood films are in Hindi, sometimes En glish, thus unintelligible for the Senegalese. Why would people watch films about a culture so different from their own? Why do they identify with Indians in particular? from interview of an older Senegalese filmmaker (Seydou) living in Paris: Seydou:but what is also interesting is that the women from our country, many of them have never attended school, they managed to understand [emphasis] those films, but really in an unbelievable [emphasis] manner. ... they will tell you the story from A to Z, Gwenda:and why? S: yes and why, this brings us again, this brings us ... to the question of approach (rapprochements culturels) of the two cultures, Those films talk to them as if they were in their own language, and in their own culture. To the contrary, if you bring them a French or American you... film, they will leave [the cinema], they won’t even know what to tell
Jaspal Singh Constructions of otherness vary in colonialist texts. In his essay “The Economy of Manichean Allegory,” for example, Abdul JanMohamed discusses two categories of colonialist, literary otherness: imaginary (emotive) literature and symbolic (reflexive) literature. In the imaginary construction, reality is defi ned by colonialists who ignore the perspective of the very people being observed. In short, reality is not what is real to both the observer and the observed, but only what is real to the former, who defi nes materiality solely from his or her perspective: (p.275) The “imaginary” representation of indigenous people tends to coalesce the signifier and the signified. In describing the attributes or actions of the native, issues such as intention, causality, extenuating circumstances, and so forth, are completely ignored; in the “imaginary” colonialist realm, to say “native” is to say “evil” and to evoke immediately the economy of the Manichean allegory. (JanMohamed 1995: 18)