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Excerpts (Notes)

We have two kinds of knowledge of things: sensuous and conceptual.  Sensuous
knowledge presents a thing in its concrete and particular awspect, whereas
conceptual knowledge presents the same thing without any note of its
particularity.  Although what we see and touch are particulars, when we think
about these particulars we cannot help using general concepts.

Objects outside the mind, as presented by our senses, are particulars,
whereas our concepts of them are general or universal.

The same is true of language also.  Almost all words in language, except
proper names, are general, whereas what exist in the outside world are
particulars.

Does the universal concepts in the mind, or the word in language, stand for
something that is objectively real? p.1

Several versions of the problem of universals

1. ontological problem: What if anything in the objective reality corresponds
   to universal concepts in the mind?  What do words, such as "man", "red",
   etc. stand for in extramental reality?
2. psychological problem:  How are universal concepts formed?  [intimately
   related with 1
3. If universal concepts are thought-constructions, how does scientific
   (objective) knowledge of the world become possible?

The most natural answer to the ontological q is that concepts and words stand
for what a number of things have in common, i.e. for universals. --> REALISM

realism:
EXTREME REALISM: The universals are entities different from particulars,
	having a separate existence, but somehow related to the particulars.
MODERATE REALISM: universals are only the common features of particulars, and
	have no existence apart from them.

non-realists:
CONCEPTUALISM: There are no universals in the outside world, they are merely
	constructs of the mind.
NOMINALISM: the only universals are words and they are made universal by
	being used of a number of different particulars.

nyAya-vaisheSika and mImAMsA : Extreme realism
   nyAya-vaisheSika : theory of sAmAnya and jAti : basis of controversy
	over universals.  Some universals based on accidental or adventitious
	features - e.g. "blind man" or "teacher", whereas others are natural
	("cow", "substance", "colour" etc.
 	n-v: universals are eternal, unlike the particulars.
	though universals are diff from the particulars, they are intimately
	connected - they are never found separately.   This intimate relation
	is called samavAya (inherence).

mimAMsA: the prabhAkara school accepts the n-v theory of universals almost
	without modification.  the kumarIla school replaces the relation of
	inherence by identity-in-difference (bhedAbheda).  It is argued
	that absolute difference between the universal and the particular is
	contrary to experience.  They are always felt as both identical and
	different.  "this is a cow" - expresses both identity and difference
	between "this" (the particular) and "cow" (universal).  Also the
	relation of samavAya is itself a category external to any particular
	relata and hence cannot be said to relate to them.

All other schools vehemently criticize the extreme realism of n-v-m.  All of
them advance arguments that are almost the same. First, no universal entity
is discovered apart from particulars is ever discovered in experience.
Second, if the universal is a separate entity, on par with the
particular, then it could not be an universal - ie. be in innumerable
particulars at once.

But opponents differ on the understanding of universals.

Jaina views (non-absolutist)

The universal and the particular are not two realities but related aspects of
the same complex reality.  [moderate realism]

later Jaina view: universals are related not by identity but by similarity of
development (sadr.shapariNAma) [conceptualism]

other Jaina writers, e.g. AbhayadevasUri refuses to recognize the existence of
universals in any form - they are merely a subjective construct with no
reality whatsoever.  Concepts and words have no objective basis - they only
stand for a set of particulars which alone have reality.  [nominalism]

Advaita (absolutist)

uninversals as absolute identity.  Universals need to have an objective
basis, but not necessary to postulate an ultimate plurality of eternal
universal as in n-v.  One ultimate universal being (sattA) appearing in
various names and forms (nAma-rUpa) by the force of primordial nescience
(avidyA).

The Advaitists thus distinguishes between two forms of reality - the
ultimate [Brahman, the substratum] and the empirically real (the universals, the
nAma-rUpa] and the particulars

SaMkhyA - also similar to advaita.

Buddhism - severest attack - rejects not only realism but also
conceptualism.  categories are  constructions of thought (apoha) --> nominalism





---blurb

A critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals
in Indian Philosophy. The central theme is the controversy between the
Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist
nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological
and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic
approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy.

In this context the view of the Grammarians with special reference to
Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail.  A brief but critical analysis
of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western
Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also
been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of
fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own
solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and
similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the
foundation of our thought and speech.