Byers, William;
How Mathematicians Think: Using Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics
Princeton University Press, 2007, 425 pages
ISBN 0691127387 9780691127385
topics: | mathematics | cognitive | philosophy
Some interesting mathematics, but banal remarks on cognition. However, Byers does succeed in highlighting the key question of how mathematics is actually done - the role of intuition - as earlier discussed in the work of Poincare, Polya, Rota, and many others.
Andrew Wiles gave the final resolution to the Fermat conjecture. The solution to Fermat was Wiles's life ambition. "When he re- vealed a proof in that summer of 1993, it came at the end of seven years of dedicated work on the problem, a degree of focus and determination that is hard to imagine." He said of this period in his life, "I carried this thought in my head basically the whole time. I would wake up with it first thing in the morning, I would be thinking about it all day, and I would be thinking about it when I went to sleep. Without distraction I would have the same thing going round and round in my mind." In an interview, Wiles reflects on the process of doing mathematical research: Perhaps I can best describe my experience of doing mathematics in terms of a journey through a dark unexplored mansion. You enter the first room of the mansion and it's completely dark. You stumble around bumping into the furniture, but gradually you learn where each piece of furni- ture is. Finally after six months or so, you find the light switch, you turn it on, and suddenly it's all illuminated. You can see exactly where you were. Then you move into the next room and spend another six months in the dark. So each of these breakthroughs, while sometimes they're momentary, sometimes over a period of a day or two, they are the culmination of-and couldn't exist without-the many months of stumbling around in the dark that precede them. This is the way it is! This is what it means to do mathematics at the highest level, yet when people talk about mathematics, the elements that make up Wiles's description are missing.
Take the following famous quote from the great French mathematician Henri Poincare. Poincare had been working on proving the existence of a class of functions that he later named Fuchsian: Just at this time I left Caen, where I was then living, to go on a geologic excursion under the auspices of the school of mines. The changes of travel made me forget my mathematical work. Having reached Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go to some place or other. At the moment when I put my foot on the step the idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it, that the transformations that I had used to define the Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidean geometry. I did not verify the idea; I should not have had time, as, upon taking my seat in the omnibus, I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect certainty. On my return to Caen, for conscience's sake I verified the result at my leisure. Poincare goes on to say: Then I turned my attention to the study of some arithmetical questions apparently without much success and without a suspicion of any connection with my preceding researches. Disgusted with my failure, I went to spend a few days at the seaside, and thought of something else. One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came to me, with just the same characteristics of brevity, suddenness, and immediate certainty, that the arithmetic transformations of inde- terminate ternary quadratic forms were identical with those of non-Euclidean geometry. Poincare's "immediate certainty" is an essential but often neglected component of mathematical truth. Truth in mathematics and the certainty that arises when that truth is made manifest are not two separate phenomena; they are inseparable from one another-different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon. p.329 Is Euler's formula, V - E + F = 2, for polyhedra correct or incorrect? It all depends-on what you call a polyhedron... the naive belief in the existence of an "objective truth." "But," some will argue, "isn't this inner certainty that you are talking about a merely subjective phenomenon whereas the truth is surely objective?" On one level this is definitely the case. Certainty arises in the mind, and one definition of "subjective" is "existing only in the mind and not independent of it." [On this point, we can quote Euler in his original paper presenting this idea: I for one have to admit that I have not yet been able to devise a strict proof of this theorem. As however the truth of it has been established in so many cases, there can be no doubt that it holds good for any solid. Thus the proposition seems to be satisfactorily demonstrated. ]
However, the "immediate certainty" Poincare refers to is also objective. It does not change from situation to situation. Poin- care, in the above excerpt, talks about two different instances of this sensation, and it is clear that it is the same certainty that he feels on both occasions. It may well be that "immediate cer- tainty" that one experiences in such situations is the same for all people at all times. Even animals may experience such certainty. Take, for example, the experiment with a talented chimpanzee named Sultan by the psychologist Wolfgang Kohler. Beyond the bars, out of arm's reach, lies an objective [a banana]; on this side, in the background of the experiment room, is placed a sawn off castor-oil bush, whose branches can be easily broken off. It is impossible to squeeze the tree through the railings, on account of its awkward shape; besides, only one of the bigger apes could drag it as far as the bars. Sultan is let in, does not immediately see the objective, and, looking about him indifferently, sucks one of the branches of the tree. But, his attention having been drawn to the objective, he approaches the bars, glances outside, the next moment turns around, goes straight to the tree, seizes a thin slender branch, breaks it off with a sharp jerk, runs back to the bars, and attains the objective. From the turning round upon the tree up to the grasping of the fruit with the broken-off branch, is one single quick chain of action, without the least "hiatus," and without the slightest movement that does not, objectively considered, fit into the solution described. a video of a chimpanzee experiment similar to the Sultan action described by Kohler. Similar experiments on a number of other animals - e.g. the New Caledonian crow: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URZ_EciujrE (metatool use) --- Sultan not only used a stick as a tool, he created the tool by breaking off the branch. His actions, after he had arrived at what can only be called an insight, were characterized by an economy of action and a sense of purpose that are reminiscent of what I have been calling "immediate certainty."